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ART. I.—MORAL LIMITS TO ECONOMIC THEORY
AND SOCIALIST COUNTER-THEORY.

1. *Lectures on Political Economy.* By Francis William Newman. London: Chapman. 1851.
2. *Lectures on Social Science and the Organization of Labour.* By James Hole. London: Chapman. 1851.
3. *Edinburgh Review.* January 1851. Art. I.—*English Socialism and Communistic Associations.*
4. *Christian Socialism and its Opponents.* A Lecture. By J. M. Ludlow, Esq. London: John W. Parker, West Strand. 1851.

THERE has never been a time in the history of Europe, when men have been at once so painfully conscious as at present, of wide-spread religious, political, and social disorganization, and so fruitlessly eager for renovated organic life. On the continent, alike in religion and politics there is "distress of nations with perplexity; the sea and the waves roaring; men's hearts failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth"—and even in England, though our political institutions stand firm, the Church is shaken to its foundation; and while on one side numbers have streamed forth attracted by the vast and wonderfully tenacious organization of Rome, it is remarkable that others, who could not accept her spiritual terms, are

now casting an eager eye on the capabilities of those great theories of social co-operation, to which the industrial population of Europe looks in the passionate hope that they will prove to be to man a new gospel of salvation. This new division of the English church hopes to glean from these theories, with requisite modifications, the germ of a new ecclesiastical life; to obtain the means by which the long alienated working-class of England may be re-united to the national church, and her too feeble and courtly life renewed from the fresh strength and vast numbers of the labouring orders.

We are far from meaning that this is a mere *move* on the part of the Christian Socialists to win over the lower classes. This would be impossible in itself; besides, the movement is certainly not a purely clerical one, though it seems to have originated with Mr. Maurice and Mr. Kingsley;—and we have much too high a respect for these earnest and able men to imply that they would hold out a mere bait for the working classes, even if they could hope that it would take. Their movement has evidently been a spontaneous and moral necessity of their own minds. But it seems likely enough that the new organic life, the new vital germ apparently offered by the co-operative theories with which Europe is so full, has perhaps unconsciously attracted them by suggesting the means of grafting once more national life into the national church. We think that they have been deceived, and have judged by false analogies in inferring that there is any *necessary* connection between systematic Socialism and Christian faith. Nor do we think that there is anything of systematic Socialism in the practical measures which they have hitherto brought forward,—measures which meet our warmest sympathy. It is the vague and mistaken principles by which they recommend their measures, and the vast organization which they propose to build up from these small beginnings, that we shall find it necessary to discuss and combat.

We have said that we believe these gentlemen quite mistaken in considering Socialism, as a system, to be vitally connected with Christian faith, or in anticipating any fruitful alliance between the communistic* ideas that now per-

* We know that the term Communism is repudiated by the new Socialist party, and fully admit the distinction so ably drawn out by Mr. Ludlow be-

vade Europe and a spiritual Christian church. There have been two distinct classes of socialist phenomena, that should be carefully separated. Some systems of Socialism have sprung *out of* a common faith, and some have been the *substitute for* a common faith. But in the former case the socialistic development has been, the accident of *special* circumstances; and the magic power of the latter over the imaginations of men is dissolved so soon as the higher spiritual bonds can be substituted, of which such systems are only the poor physical shadows.

When, as in the case of early Christianity, of the Essenes, Moravians, and the brothers of Herrnhut, a common faith drew close together a small number of persons, separated by a broad line of demarcation from the rest of the religious world, a close and intimate connection arose which really united them for a time as members of one family, a connection which rendered the socialist system natural and harmless. The moral injury of all artificial socialism springs, as Mr. Newman has well stated, from its tacit assumption that men's "duties are equal towards all; which is untrue. To have any but a very secondary care for those who are unconnected with me in the relations of life, would be a hurtful Quixotism." (Newman's Lectures, p. 10.) Now, if from accidental circumstances, from the hostility or indifferent bearing of the world around, the small numbers of a religious sect, and the intense sympathies which unite its members on the highest subjects, they are *naturally* brought into that closer union which usually does not embrace wider limits than a single family, the moral hurtfulness of the system disappears. True, indeed, this intense sympathy and spiritual isolation may itself, as in the case of the Herrnhuters and the Essenes, be the result of narrow and injurious views; but then the evil lies in these views themselves, not in the social system which is their natural consequence, and which would disappear with its cause. And in the case of early Christianity, the socialist connection, in which the first brethren were united, appears to have been at once perfectly natural, and essentially transient. While they were separated by so wide a barrier

tween Communistic and Socialistic systems. The connection of Communistic and Socialistic ideas is however sufficiently close to warrant the exchange of terms as applied only to their leading aspects.

from the heathen and corrupt world around them, collected in small societies, sharers of a common danger, and sustained by the same hopes, it was natural enough that this intense and special community of interest, as well as of faith, should have drawn close the religious, till it became a quasi-domestic tie, and thus elevated the secondary relations of life nearly to a level with the primary. But as soon as the world around became christianized also, and, persecution disappearing, the terrible force of common perils no longer remained to level all distinctions of class and education, the special socialistic form of Christianity naturally disappeared, while the faith survived as a spiritual principle to regulate the lives of individuals, and quite uncommitted to any narrow system of property law. When these socialist systems have been connected with a pure Christian faith, the bond has been, we believe, some spontaneous but special result of time and circumstance, not an essential product of the faith itself. And against such exceptional cases of Socialism we have no moral accusations to bring. The evil lies in the effort to produce it as an artificial system, where it is *not* a reflex of inward ties (which, in ordinary circumstances, it never can be), but is regarded as the means of generating them; where it is brought forward as a patent cement to supersede or extend the narrower but intenser attractions of human affection.

But most of the socialistic and communistic systems have been, not results of faith, but substitutes for faith. The genius of man abhors limits of time and space. It cannot live without an infinite horizon. And even in blindest Atheism and grossest selfishness it will seek and cherish some theory grand enough to present almost the sublime proportions of a faith. The great communistic and socialistic theories of the last and the present century seem to us, notwithstanding their gross practical developments, to be, relatively to the moral phenomena of their time, rather redeeming symptoms than the worst products of the age which produced them. They assert at least the incapacity of the mind for living in a narrow and selfish circle of its own: their subordination of the individual to social regulations, is a kind of physical substitute for the submission of individual wills to the spiritual affections and

universal laws of God: their sanguine promises of the indefinite progress of the race, and ultimate universal order and happiness, is the only possible atheistic and yet unselfish equivalent for the immortal hopes and pure aspirations of Christian trust. It is not possible to doubt from the strange and sometimes disinterested lives of many of the founders and supporters of these systems, such as Owen, Fourier, and St. Simon, that the changes and new influences hoped-for as the results of their theories, stood to them, and still stand to the masses of Communists and Socialists in England and elsewhere, in lieu of a religion. It seems therefore to us to be a totally mistaken notion on the part of this new socialist school, that they can find in the ideas now so widely diffused on the continent of Europe, and amongst our own labouring classes, any principle of life that can be made to amalgamate with a true Christian church. That those ideas may contain some economical truth, we are not disposed to deny; but that which gives them their power on the hearts of the masses, and which now diffuses them so widely among the nations, is exactly that which would seem both needless and miserably gross to a people really inspired and guided by a spiritual faith. In the absence of that faith, these notions indeed win way and strength, because they are the noblest that can gain access to minds overshadowed by sensualism and grown up in doubt; they lift a man at least beyond his own selfish desires to contemplate the future of the race, at the same time that they promise to each in the present a larger than his present share of worldly good; and the change of property regulations, because a tangible and visible cause, is credited with any effects in the future that the most sanguine thought can infer. But we believe it to be a wholly false inference that, in order to gain over such communists to Christianity, a true Christian church needs to appropriate any of their ideas; it has already, in its own spiritual and universal faith, all that is noble in those ideas; and the low medium by which Socialism hopes to win its victories, and the earthly character of those victories when won, are wholly foreign to the genius of Christ's religion. It is not however an unnatural mistake for faithful and noble minds, within a decaying church, and viewing the masses of the people all outside and eager for quite other ideas

of a social and political cast, to hope that by meeting them on their own ground, and according them what sympathy they could, such zeal might be diverted into the channel of Christian faith. It is a hard thing to see a church left unto us desolate, while life is busy and eager all around with its secular interests, and its industrial glories; hard, at least, to those who believe that they have something much more glorious within, if men would only have the ears to hear it: ἐχθίστη δὲ ὁδὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατεῖν. These Christian Socialists should first have asked, however, if there was no other barrier excluding the nation from the national church, than the spiritual deafness of its children. We presume from Mr. Kingsley's late excited declaration of faith, that he at least would admit none. But while the Church is hemmed in with creeds to keep the many out, and while the prayer-book quarrels with the articles for the few inside; while she can boast a fugitive-slave law for escaped clergymen that may be wielded by any Bishop of the Exeter school; while, in short, all her liberality is amiable inconsistency, and all her bigotry native and sincere, we think that a want of sympathy with Socialism need not have been pitched on as the *only* barrier that keeps out the million from her pale.

Before we proceed to look more closely into the contending claims of the Economists and the new Socialist party, we may remark that the writer of the able article in the Edinburgh Review, placed at the head of this notice, who led the attack upon the latter in the name of Political Economy—and who, even where we think him successful, assumes an unnecessarily scolding tone of scientific compassion towards a party that is at least earnest, generous, and weak—has entirely missed, as we think, the source of socialist error, in classifying the Economists and Christian Socialists as respectively the “thinkers,” and “feelers,” the “systematic” and “impulsive” philanthropists, those who think out the causes of misery, and those who only wish to alleviate its symptoms. He has exposed himself to the obvious reply, of which Mr. Ludlow accordingly skilfully avails himself, that it is the Socialist party, *par excellence*, which has been hitherto distinguished by a dogmatic spirit of system. We should not think this

trifling point concerning the prevailing cast of Socialist thought worth notice, did it not touch upon a principle that we believe to be of vital importance. The Economists and the Socialists, all theorists in short, are necessarily *thinkers*, as distinguished from feelers, and only differ in their point of view. The Edinburgh Reviewer has *made* his theory for the special phenomena that he had before him in the writings of Mr. Kingsley. The true and distinctive error of the Socialists is as old as Plato, and curiously exemplified in his Republic; it arises in attending to social phenomena *before* individual, in striving to explain the latter by the former and to deduce the latter from the former, instead of adopting the converse method so familiar to modern science. It is an error allied with the Pantheistic systems of philosophy, as distinguished from the psychological; and still more with states of civilization where centralized legislation supersedes local self-government, so that, as lately in France, men look to parliament for their organizations, instead of leaving it to parliament chiefly to take up, register, and modify the customs naturally springing up among the people. The introduction to Plato's Republic so curiously confirms and illustrates this position, that we must extract it for the benefit of our readers. He has been trying to find the definition of moral excellence (*δικαιοσύνη*), and after rejecting some false definitions, and failing to find the true one, he proceeds thus (Republic II. 368 D.) :—

“ Since then we are not sharp-sighted enough, it seems to me, I said, that we must conduct our search after it, in such a manner as if some one had ordered short-sighted persons to read aloud very small letters from a distance, and then somebody had observed that the same letters were to be found somewhere else, both larger and on a larger ground : it would be considered a great gain, I suppose, first to read the larger letters, and, with this preparation, to come to the study of the less, if they happened to be the same. Certainly, said Adeimantus, but what similar help do you discern, Socrates, in our investigation concerning the morally excellent? I will tell you, I said. Moral excellence, we say, belongs indeed to the individual, but belongs also in some sense or other to the entire state? Certainly, he said. Is not then the state greater than the individual? It is greater, said he. Perhaps then moral excellence might be found on a larger scale in the greater object, and easier too

to apprehend? If you like then, *let us first inquire what is its nature in states, and then, with this preparation, we will study it also in the individual*, having regard, in forming our conception of the less, to its resemblance to the greater."

The pre-eminence of a great thinker is always seen in his clear and conscious exposition of what is really the secret mental standard by which he judges the world around him. In the passage we have extracted, Plato has clearly stated, and adopted for his own, the great leading vice of pantheistic philosophy, and socialistic politics. No true social science can ever arise which is not based deep on a true moral science. The larger must be studied in the less, not the less in the larger. A correct moral theory may lead us on to that philosophy of politics, to which hitherto we have so blindly and cautiously been groping our way. The mode of procedure can never be reversed without utterly destructive results. And as Plato, pre-eminently the greatest thinker of the old and vicious school, lost his way perhaps from the very magnificence of his imagination, which made him prefer a free range for his keen and tranquil eye over the great vivid outlines and varied surface of society, to the painful and intricate task of disentangling the mysteries of his own soul; so all his numerous and meaner followers, down to Fourier with his systematic elaborations of the most whimsical and astounding trash,* and Owen with his revolting parodies on the moral nature of man, have betrayed the most utter ignorance of the individual life, and only approach the confines of sane intellectual vision when dealing with the apparent phenomena of society at large. We do not for one moment intend to charge this blunder, to at all the same extent, on the Socialist party now under review. Indeed, we believe that the ultra-Economists have deviated nearly as much in one direction from that psychological point of view which elaborates a social creed from the careful study of the moral aptitudes of man, as the Christian socialists have in another. But we believe that any of the errors that are now chargeable on these soberer socialist theorists will be found to have this root, a laxity in collating their social theory with those laws of man's individual nature

* See a thorough examination of the leading French theories in our XVth Number, August, 1848, Article III.

which all such theories, if correct, must consult and express. All the success, truth, and scientific value of Political Economy, arises obviously in its having taken, as the one main thread of the science, the universal desire of men for ownership and enjoyment of so much that is limited in quantity. All its failure and error has arisen, we believe, from considering this as the *only* desire, as one neither yielding to higher affections, nor displaced by ignorance, inertia, and the love of ease; all that has been morally injurious in it has arisen from forgetting that there are times and circumstances in which it *ought* to be displaced by higher motives, where the inferences to be drawn from the hypothesis of self-interest acting alone, deserve consideration only as showing *probable temptations*, not scientific laws. When the rules of political economy are spoken of as "laws of nature," pains should at least be taken to distinguish them from the irresistible laws of the physical universe. Economical language would generally imply that the science does not deal simply with human customs, more or less natural, but with mechanical powers as little within our control as tidal attractions, or centrifugal force. We think it a wise and scientific distinction to limit the term "laws of nature" to *necessary* laws, which, whether in matter or mind, are totally independent of our volitions; conditions which we can neither modify nor escape. If this distinction, well known to philosophy, were observed, the rules of Political Economy would not be natural but *moral* laws, customs into which indeed society often spontaneously falls, but which can be more or less modified by social regulations and individual wills. We are quite aware that the leading Economists fully recognize this characteristic of the Economical laws, and that Mr. Mill, and after him Mr. Newman, in this most able and instructive book (which exhibits, we think, no less moral than economical wisdom), repeatedly disavow the creed that Economic ends alone either are or ought to be the only criteria of moral and political expediency. But even they appear sometimes practically to fall into this error; and we are sure that the Edinburgh Review school of Economists have done more to lend strength and truth to the wholesale charges brought against the professors of that science by the socialist party, than any new truths

which this party has attained. When, for instance, Mr. Newman says in this wholesale manner (Lectures, p. 63), "Now the grand and noble moral Theorem expounded by Political Economists is this, that the laws of the Market which individual interest generates, are precisely those which tend best to the universal benefit," we think that he greatly overstates the truth, and gives to the law a grand universality which is both untrue as a fact, and very dangerous as a faith; and when again he says (p. 119), "Competition is in the market of the world, what gravitation is in the mechanism of the heavens, an all-combining, all-balancing, and beneficent law," he seems to us to make a statement so much beyond the fact, that from the magnificence of his claim it makes a near approach to the ridiculous. We cannot wonder that such assertions in the face of the ruinous selfishness, and disgraceful waste, which the strict adherence to the laws of the market, and the competitive principle have produced in the numerous cases of commercial disease, should drive the socialist party into the wild assertion that competition is sinful, and that the laws of the market ought to be repealed in favour of a guild-hall legislation.

This is so vital a question, and stands so completely on the threshold of the discussion between the Economists and the Socialists, that elementary and simple as it is, we must devote a brief space to its discussion. "There can be no price, without a market, and no market without competition," say Mr. Newman and the Economists, and to us at least this seems nearly an obvious, elementary, and axiomatic truth. But then they go on to state that any prices fixed by competition are *always* the best for the world in general, and moreover the only possible prices,—a proposition which we believe to be often totally false. And the *Edinburgh Review* (January, 1851, pp. 22, 23, 24) carries this position so far as apparently to extol, not only as high benefit, but as a consequence of irresistible laws, the excessive cheapness of the slop-shops, and all such overstocked employments. On the other hand, the Socialists deny altogether that competition is any element in price, seem to think that all articles have a *natural* value even prior to the thought of an exchange, and apparently believe either that things have been divinely

ticketed with their natural and fair value, or that councils of trade are directly inspired with lists of equitable prices, but that Satan has rubbed out the figures, intercepted the heavenly tariff, and suggested instead the diabolic principle of letting all things fetch what men are inclined to give. Now between these two extreme theories the true mean is surely not hard to find, theoretically at least, whatever may be the difficulty of solving the details of particular cases. We fully agree with Mr. Newman when he says, "No doubt, even in marketing, room is left for liberality; yet liberality is not, cannot, and ought not to be, the main and moving principle. *One's own interest* is the main and rightful one, of which we ought not to let sentimental moralists make us ashamed." This is obvious, we think, from the very nature of exchange, which is meant to be a mutual benefit. Now the benefit is of course proportioned to the desire, and hence the man with the intenser desire to exchange, must, of course, increase the largeness or temptingness of his offer, till he brings up the weaker desire of the other trafficking party to a level with his own. It is quite a first principle that equal desires should exchange equally (the cost of production, and rarity of the article, and possibility of getting it at less cost elsewhere, being of course included in this principle as augmenting or diminishing the desire to keep or gain), and without it there could be no "*value*," which can have no absolute and objective, but only a relative and subjective meaning, denoting at any one time what a thing is worth to me; the rate at which men can agree to exchange with me so as to cause most mutual benefit. Thus various desires measuring themselves against each other naturally produce the phenomena of value and price.* This then is the competitive principle, and is the natural and healthy foundation of commerce, that men can best try by freely measur-

* Nothing here said in the least diminishes the iniquity of extorting from the ignorant and uncivilized savages of New Zealand (for example) prices far higher than would willingly be accepted from a European trader in the same market. It is said that our goods are worth what the savage gives for them to him, or he would not give it. True—but they would not be worth that to him were it not concealed from him what the cost of production has been. The sin is a moral one, of practising upon his ignorance and inexperience. It is known that he would abstain rather than give so much more than what would be needful to excite the desire of the seller. And therefore he is insincerely kept in ignorance.

ing their mutual desires, and their disinclinations to abstain, in what ratios they can most satisfactorily exchange things limited in supply. But to this principle the following limitations apply. That a thing shall be worth anything to me, I must be ensured the conditions for enjoying it, that is, I must have the means of life; otherwise it is not a measuring of mere desires with desires, but of desires with *wants*; and the difference is essential, as the alternative of abstinence, always possible in the former case, is not applicable in the latter, so that the parties are not on equal terms, and the candidate for existence must concede anything, however unequal, to the candidate for mere pleasure. This principle of mere competition, therefore, is not equitably applicable to the case where labourers compete for bare subsistence; for, where men have lost their natural share in the common instrument of production, land, unless the alternative of a decent subsistence in return for hard labour were offered by a poor-law, the grossest injustice may be done by admitting the competing principle. This is now admitted by our ablest political Economists, by Mr. Mill in substance, and by Mr. Newman completely. And this is the reason why mere *custom* fixes so often a minimum to the price of labour, which it cannot permanently fix to the price of anything but labour. Profits have no minimum but the lowest remuneration on which men are content to go on producing. No article can have a permanent minimum price much above the cost of its production, which is the least for which men will take the trouble to produce it. But without attaining the physical minimum at which life can be supported, labour has in almost all trades a customary minimum price, less than which respectable masters will not pay, although they might find men in abundance to take it. It is truly felt that the competitive principle is not properly applicable here, where a labourer has not the alternative of abstinence; since before a man can determine fairly what anything is worth to him, he must have that which gives everything its worth—life, and the possibility of enjoyment. A customary minimum therefore for wages, considerably above the physical minimum, is not only an actual phenomenon, but one justifiable without impeaching the competitive principle when kept within fair

limits, and is ultimately grounded simply on this, that while competing desires decide the phenomena of price, men's consciences revolt against allowing their minor desires to dictate terms to the urgent necessities of nature. Here then the whole grounds of the questions are shifted from economy to morals, and justice demands that the commercial game shall not be carried on till the weapon of defence be restored to the adversary.

The best means of raising this partial moral custom into a universal one, would be by pauper-colonies, advocated by Mr. Newman, and with some other provisions of doubtful benefit elaborately urged by Mr. Hole, which concede as a *right* the means of subsistence to those willing to accept the requisite terms of hard labour and strict moral superintendence, instead of making it, as now, a mark of disgrace. But till such a provision exists, we think the preservation of this customary minimum of wages in the various trades, of the highest benefit to the working classes; and we know of nothing more discreditable to the ultra-economical school than their habit of implying at least, if not explicitly affirming, that the practice of the extremest lowering of wages attainable by taking advantage of the overstocked state of the labour-market, is benevolent, involuntary, and wise. The Edinburgh Reviewer (in the passage we have referred to) seems explicitly to defend this practice on all these pleas. And much as we dislike the lurid, unsubdued, excited rhetoric poured out by Mr. Kingsley on the subject, we cannot wonder that the affirmation of such an opinion by the Economical party should shock and disgust the Christian Socialists into the use of no unmeasured terms. We will briefly examine all the so-called economic defences of this system, premising that we mean to condemn only that class of capitalists, who, finding a moral minimum for wages fixed in any trade, try to force a new or larger demand through a depression of prices which they can effect, only in consequence of the overstocked state of the labour-market, by lowering that minimum down to the physical minimum, or even below it. We believe that such men are the scourges of trade; and that there is no argument, moral or economical, in their favour. This position seems to us so obvious, and of so little economical

importance, that we should not take the trouble of proving it, were it not for the disgrace that its denial has so undeservedly brought on economical science. The first plea, that this lowering of price is involuntary, would virtually amount to a denial that custom can fix the rate of wages at all. It only *can* fix a minimum. Of course wages must be variable, and must be limited by the wages-fund. But as there is a limit at which men will find it too unprofitable to produce at all, when capital migrates to another trade, so there is a limit of wages below which in all trades the better class of masters will not pay, but would rather seek other investment for their capital. If the labourers were few, this limit would be fixed *by them*, they would refuse to accept lower remuneration than they could get elsewhere. While they are many, it can be, and usually is, fixed by the moral feeling of masters, who will not give less than at least a barely adequate remuneration. Certainly it is much *better* that it should be fixed by the workmen, because then the competitive cheapening of the market becomes *impossible*; but it is far better that it should be fixed by the masters than not at all. The result of such a custom is, that in times of temporary commercial depressions, masters will work short time, lower their profits, or even suffer a temporary loss rather than lower the rate of wages below the moral minimum to which the labourers are habituated; and that in case prices are permanently depressed too low to admit even this minimum, capitalists will choose other investments rather than strive to keep up their profit by offering the physical minimum of wages. Of course this latter result must be one that had been gradually prepared for by constantly falling profits, so that time would be allowed for withdrawing capital gradually, in the mode described by Mr. Mill (*Principles of Political Economy*, Vol. i., p. 486, 1st edition). Now the *possibility* of this state of things being demonstrated, the reply next made is, that it is very undesirable: that the cheap traders who lower prices by giving starvation wages, do a positive good to the working classes by "equalising" the distribution of the wages-fund amongst labourers of the same trade, instead of employing a few at decent remunerations, and excluding many from employment altogether. We are

extremely surprised to find Mr. Newman (inconsistently with his own theory in other places, we think) maintaining this view (Lecture III., pp. 72, *et seq.*). On every account it seems clear to us that a custom maintaining the rate of wages considerably above the physical minimum would act both economically and morally with good results to the labourers and masters. There is no evil so great as that of reducing a whole class of workmen to the edge of starvation. It is virtually reducing *all* to a state lower than that of paupers, while the exclusion of surplus-labourers would only pauperize *some*. The equalisation of wages is then, in fact, the equalisation of misery, the introduction of the desperate state, where prudence and honest ambition becomes impossible amongst the whole class of workmen, good as well as bad; while the reduction of the number employed, would, at least, have the advantage of keeping in good employment the best and most useful men, and pauperise at first only the most helpless and undeserving. Nothing can seem to us more clear than that a master's duty is to employ a few on decent remuneration, rather than many on the verge of ruin. No moral relations are possible towards men barely kept from starvation; to secure the conditions of moral life to a few, is surely a duty far above that of giving the conditions of mere physical life to many. As a population-question merely, it would be preferable too, at least on Mr. Mill's plausible theory, that among those kept considerably above the physical minimum of wages, the increase is comparatively slow, while if all are wretched, all increase with equal rapidity. But on the economical ground which Mr. Newman himself has developed with so much care and ability, that the great aim to be kept in view, and yet the most difficult to carry out, is to accelerate as much as possible the transition of labourers from the over-producing to the under-producing departments, it is far more advisable to diminish the number of the employed, than to reduce their wages to the lowest physical possibilities. The former method puts at once in evidence the pressing need for abandoning the over-producing trade; the latter disappoints them with lingering hopes, and protracts the slow agonies by which, at length, they are taught the necessity of change. The former method shows the real

pauperism, and enables society at once to deal with it in the best way: the latter conceals and aggravates its real amount by the external show of an employment which really covers more than the moral evils of pauperism. That Mr. Newman, who insists so much on the value of permanent and moral relations between the employer and employed, should advocate this extreme reduction of the rate of wages, rather than the exclusion of some labourers from employment, strikes us with astonishment. The slop system destroys the possibility of such permanent and moral relation. Once descend to the physical minimum of wages, and you lose all possibility of any relation but that of "simple contract,"—a relation which an Edinburgh Reviewer* seems really to regard as the satisfactory and permanent relation between capitalists and the working classes. We can only account for Mr. Newman's opinion on this question by the very broad and unnatural division that he has attempted to make between the economical and moral problems connected with his science, which has perhaps caused him to overlook the moral sides of a question, till he came to consider them separately. Still the economic arguments seem to us equally strong (though they necessarily pass into the moral arguments) for keeping up, wherever it is possible, a fair customary minimum rate for wages, which should render it discreditable for capitalists to attempt to force an increased demand at the expense of lowering the customary minimum of wages. Mr. Newman puts the dilemma that the surplus labourers must either be starved, or employed at the expense of the others. In a country so full of capital as England, it is by no means true that poor-rates to support the sur-

* April 1851. Art. I., pp. 332, 333. We are much mistaken if this article be not by the able writer of the article on Christian Socialism in the January number; there is the same ability and curious juxtaposition of a genial, hopeful spirit, with ultra-economical views, instead of that fusion between the spirit of science with wide social sympathies shown in Mr. Mill's great work. Surely the writer does not think that the simple contract is anything more than the mere preliminary legal condition of a *moral* relation involving mutual duties of which the "contract" takes no notice? No feudal relation, scarcely even slavery, could, in our opinion, be so ruinous to society as one where the upper and lower classes owned no relations beyond legal and self-interested ties. Is there no obligation to unite the *sympathies* and the interests, too, of these different classes? The spirit of the article would contradict its letter.

plus labourers diminish at all proportionately the capital that would be employed productively as a wages-fund. Besides, when the state gets the superintendence of these surplus labourers as paupers, they may be taught and employed productively in other understocked departments. And, indeed, the actual starvation of some would be preferable to the moral degradation of all, by forcing down the rate of wages to the physical minimum of the slop-system. We have spent a space very disproportionate to the economic importance of the subject on this special question of the advantage of a customary rate of wages above the lowest market-rate that might be attained by the competitive principle. But we were anxious to show that economical science has no interest in maintaining so revolting a theory as the ordinary one. Pauper labour is just the one article to which there is a natural minimum of value affixed, without the intervention of competition; though even labour, which has *other* sources of support, has no natural value apart from what it is worth to its owner. But competition postulates some power of abstinence on both sides, or men feel it to be a tyranny and supersede it by a custom. And such a custom rightly gains the alliance of moral feeling.

Another inference to be drawn from the purely subjective meaning of value (*viz.* that value is the exchanging rate of different objects of human desire), which also limits the competitive principle, is this. A desire may be weaker than it *ought* to be, because it has been neglected and uncultivated, or it may be altogether deficient, so that even the slightest obstacle may be enough to prevent it from seeking and gaining its appropriate satisfaction. Now in the ordinary cases of market value this can never be so. We do not profess to fix what *ought* to be a man's desire for cheese, or velvet, or silver spoons; in such things the strength of the desire arises in accidental circumstances, and there can be no moral obligation for any one to demand spades or jewels independently of his wish. But there are cases in which the desire is one which the conscience acknowledges as native to any morally-developed mind, and which yet cannot be gratified without cost. Such a desire is the parent's desire for the education of his children. Now, if the principle

of competition were here fully admitted, it would result, as Mr. Mill has pointed out, in cutting off from education the children of all those whose families most require it. Parents caring nothing for their children's welfare would adopt at once the alternative of abstinence rather than incur the cost of procuring instruction. In such a case, to let the economical system work unrestricted, and offer education only where previous demand called the supply into existence, would be to abdicate the noblest function of government in refusing to notice and counteract the ignorance and selfishness of multitudes. Other cases of this same principle might be adduced. We think, then, that we have sufficiently shown that there are these moral limits to the sphere of the competitive principle,—(1) that the alternative of abstinence must be physically possible on both sides, to render competition *fair*; and (2) that this alternative must be exercisable without *moral* evil to those exercising it, or to others involved in the act, in order to render competition beneficial. Nevertheless, as regards purely unmoral desires, neither physically nor morally vital, the principle of competition rightly fixes, and alone can permanently regulate, exchange-value. No custom can long exist to regulate value, apart from competition, except it have a moral root: and the only moral root of such a custom is either the justice of men, which refuses to accept the capitulation of too eager necessities; or their philanthropy, which will not acquiesce in the lamentable absence of desires that ought to be moral necessities in all civilized men. But in the case of desires whose gratification is a condition neither of physical nor of moral existence, competition can alone fix value, for *nothing but* the actual force of such desires is then given us, by which to determine how their objects should exchange together. We trust that we have thus sufficiently explained why we cannot use the language of Economists, who treat the hypothetical laws of distribution that are deduced from the supposition that men will and ought to use all the power they have of acquiring the objects of their desire at the least possible sacrifice, either as *necessary*, like the laws of physical nature, or as *obligatory*, like the laws of conscience. On the contrary we have shown them, we think, to be subject not merely to accidental, but large *systematic* exceptions, in part actual,

like the exceptions introduced by custom among employers and by Government with respect to education and the factory system ; and in part yet unrealized, but peremptorily demanding introduction.

Mr. Newman's book appears to us to take a wavering view of this subject, sometimes resisting the claims of Economy to guide completely the measures of statesmen and the minds of individuals, and sometimes admitting its word as paramount in regulating the distribution of wealth. We think that this disposition to regard economic laws, as either irresistible necessities or divine provisions, always beneficent in their result, and which only require study, not modification, has arisen very much from the excessive attention lately paid to the phenomena of free international trade, where in all existing cases the moral limits we have noticed have no application. Nations do not stand in mutual relations sufficiently close either to admit of that absolute dictation of terms which is possible from capital to an overstocked labour-market, without leaving even the alternative of abstinence ; or to allow those moral considerations to creep in as to what *ought* to be the desires of sister countries, which are imperatively forced on a government with respect to the moral needs of its own people. The closer the relations between traders, the more complicated become their duties, and the more numerous are exceptions to the rules founded on the theory of mere competition. In international trade, however, these relations are at their loosest, and there is nothing to control the principle that value may fairly be measured by the mutual strength of contending desires. Moreover, just in the cases where the moral problems of home-markets become most difficult, and the result of hard bargaining between capital and labour begins to seem unfair, and from the low price of labour the least time is left for mental education and the least desire shown for it,—the opening of foreign markets alleviates the evil by drawing off the products of overstocked trades, and so rendering unnecessary that migration of labour to other employments which the unpliant texture of the English character seems to obstruct so painfully. Hence has sprung naturally enough the strong feeling in favour of non-interference with the natural laws of trade, and hence it has risen almost to a moral antipathy towards any meddling of

government or proposed interference of any sort with the province of political economy. But if the students of economy had looked less to the results of international interference (which has certainly been almost always prejudicial), and more to the exceptional cases of individual trades, we should have heard nothing of the pompous theorem, echoed from one economist to another, that the laws of trade which individual interest generates, always turn out to be precisely those which tend most to the universal benefit: for this, though the usual law of trade when the actual desires are assumed to be the right desires, or at all events to be incapable of modification, and where all desire has equally the alternative of foregoing its satisfaction, has been shown to be inapplicable in cases where ignorance has buried some wants altogether, and the unnatural pressure of competition has sharpened others to an impatient craving which must either make terms or die. No one, for instance, can deny that Fourier's master, who, in a time of famine-prices, destroyed a quantity of damaged rice to enhance the price of the rest, may have acted quite wisely according to the laws of trade, "which individual interest generates." Yet that this could have tended to the universal benefit, that it was any thing but a criminal and wicked waste, no one, we suppose, would be found to assert. It is *à priori* most improbable, and as a matter of fact most false, that any lower principle like self-interest is ever exactly co-incident and co-extensive in its operation with a higher one, as philanthropy. God does not in this way provide us with practical duplicates in our moral motives, principles quite distinct in worth, but marvellously identical in result. He does not sanction even in trade the ascription of our actions to the nobler thought of philanthropy, along with the comfortable appropriation of all the consequences of self-interest's keen-eyed calculations. When self-interest ought to decide us, it is mere folly in the Socialists to vilify and disown it; but where the sway of individual self-interest would be unfair, and injurious to society, it is mere sophistry to insist on its *generally* beneficial operation, in order to justify special grievance, and the needless toleration of social ills. The truth we believe to be, that there are various cases in which both individuals and governments are bound to interfere to modify

the unrestricted action of the competitive principle. Where the introduction of machinery dispenses suddenly with the demand for a large quantity of skilled labour, and so renders an instant change of trade necessary, which to the unversatile English is scarcely possible;* where, from the facility of the operations, the competition for employment in any one trade becomes oppressive; where ignorance and degradation causes that to be resigned as a luxury which ought to be sought as a necessary; and where men cannot find employment in any trade who are nevertheless willing to work: in all such cases we think it morally imperative on combinations of individuals, or the state itself, (which-ever can act with most effect,) to interfere with the rigorous operation of the principle of *laissez faire*, and substitute moral superintendence for this blind faith in the infallibility of individual self-seeking.

Before concluding that part of our observations which applies to the moral limits which economists have sometimes transgressed, and turning to the mistaken remedial theory put forward by the Christian Socialists, we may just notice a point, raised into its true importance by Mr. Newman, which extends national education from a moral into an economical question. The great practical evils that arise in the operation of our system of trade have, nearly all, one source, the difficulty of transferring easily capital and labour from one occupation to another. The accumulations of fixed capital are the obstructions in the former case, and so give the labourers some hold on their employers; but the habits of workmen are so rigid as to prevent them from easily taking up new tasks; and this keeps men educated in a certain trade too much in dependence on the capitalists of that trade. Mr. J. S. Mill has brought some evidence to show that this rigidity of character is peculiarly remarkable with English workmen, who,

* It seems to us a defect of Mr. Newman's able book, that, disgusted by the partizanship lately displayed in favour of labour, and against capital, he has rather fallen into the opposite error, and taken the side of capital. Thus in discussing the effects of machinery and the conversion of circulating capital into fixed, he lays it down (p. 99), that "in every economical light in which it can be viewed, machinery is the greatest friend to the poor," and seems quite to forget the terrible temporary distress that it really may cause on its first introduction, by diminishing the gross outlay of capitalists in payment of wages, though it increase their net profits. This result is now admitted by all the leading economists.

though more diligent and skilful, are far less versatile than those of other countries. Now the welfare of the labouring classes depends most painfully on the fluidity of the labouring mass, on their immediate yielding wherever the pressure of competition is greatest, and flowing to the part where it is least. And not till the labourers are universally educated can this condition ever be even partially fulfilled. Nothing can give pliancy and readiness to their faculties, but deeper and more comprehensive knowledge. Hence, merely to sustain the economical theorem that labour is attracted towards the highest wages, a national education is an essential postulate. We may add, that this is more than ever true in a time when over-production of material things is imminent, and the demands, which it will best remunerate labour to supply, are turning towards the results of art, science, talent and genius. Mr. Mill, and after him Mr. Newman, have shown, with at least practical accuracy, that an absolutely universal glut is an imaginary fear. But none of the arguments which tend to prove it so, have taken notice that the higher desires which spring into existence directly the lower ones are satisfied, are usually not desires which can be mechanically and infallibly satisfied by the employment of capital and physical labour. All the arguments which Mr. Mill uses, only go to prove that there is no fear of the failure of human desire; so that there can never be total over-production, but only erroneous production; and as proof, he offers the fact of over-production itself, which would not, he rightly says, go on, if all the desires were satisfied for which the superfluous products could be exchanged. Only it is quite possible that the unsatisfied desires which men seek thus to gratify may be reaching more and more into that intellectual and imaginative world, where no hours of work and expenditure of capital in machinery will suffice to gratify them; where, in fact, the demand is not merely a demand for labour, but for land, natural beauty, and the products of a labour that is blended with education, taste and genius. If this be so, it is more than ever necessary in a mere economical point of view, that the labouring classes should be educated, and all the resources of their minds drawn out, in order to allow of drafting off as many as possible into the higher departments of educated skill, and creative taste. Nor is

it sufficient to say with Mr. Mill, that till the demands of the *lower* classes have been satisfied for material products, there can be no danger of wide-spread over-supply. Because till the first of these demands is satisfied, the demand for food, further demands can never spread rapidly among them ; but the further supply of this one demand can only be made at an increased cost, by spending more capital on the land, and so cannot in itself cause greater consumption ; and hence, not till the lower classes are better paid as labourers in *other* productive operations, so that they can afford to compass the increased price of food necessary for increased production, will their lower wants be sufficiently satisfied to enable them to enter the markets as competitors for those products with which the higher classes may be over-supplied. We cannot think that general and frequent over-supply is at all an imaginary danger, while the great masses of the community remain mere mechanical instruments, without any power in themselves of calling out and extending human wants and desires by mingling thought and beauty with bare laborious skill.

We have occupied so much space in discussing the moral limits to the economical system, that we have comparatively little left for what had been our main purpose—the examination of the grand theory by which the Christian socialists propose to remedy the great evils of trade. We believe, however, that defect and extravagance are then most injurious when a theory is nearest to the truth : uncontrolled allies often do more towards defeat than the sharpest antagonists : and a camp whose outposts are not distinctly marked, is always liable to surprise. Besides, in this instance, it is all-important that the socialists should not be permitted to be the sole claimants for high and generous principle. If a system of selfish plutonomy can be fastened on their opponents, the looseness of their own reasoning will not prevent them from gaining the day. It has therefore seemed all-important to us to show that we are aware of the grave exaggerations into which economists may push their science, when its fundamental assumptions have ceased to hold good ; and we hope in this way to secure a more patient hearing for our criticism on the Christian socialists themselves.

The central point in the Christian socialist theory is the

proposal to supply the various commercial wants of society by organizations exactly suited to that purpose; by concert rather than by competition; by calculating the demands in each department and establishing co-operative associations united by a central board of direction, to supply them, instead of the present clumsy mode of allowing men to crowd without limit into each trade, so long as there is any hope of gaining a livelihood by any art of self-recommendation, till the only test of a too full supply is the frequent failure of individual attempts to establish a profitable business. The arguments to be used in favour of this proposal are obvious enough. The only instances on record, it is said, of effective and unwasteful management in distributive occupations, are those where a deliberative body of men, or single minds, have selected the instruments for executing their own plans, and, as in our Post-office, and Government-offices, the labourers have been limited and selected by those who have the means of passing in review the tasks that must be performed. And further, that this system is thus superior in an economical point of view, it is said, is only the least of its advantages. As a moral system it is as superior in the influences it diffuses, as were the quiet and combined efforts of Christians working under one common master, with one common purpose, and in a common spirit, to the noisy strife of the competing shrines of Paganism, bidding against each other with dishonest promises for the selfish patronage of heathen fears. For while in the former case all the employed are essential to each other, so that no occasion arises for mutual jealousy and rival hopes, in the latter each is unnecessary to the other, and feels that by another's removal his own sphere would be enlarged; because, even in production, the fewer the labourers, the greater would be the value of labour; and in distribution, almost the same cost in arrangement would be equally adequate to a larger as to a smaller business connexion. Under this last head comes the consideration of the too numerous class of middlemen, which it is maintained that the competitive system calls into existence. And by removing these middlemen, it is said, much capital might be saved for production, that is now wasted in superfluous multiplication of the instruments of distribution. Such are the

arguments urged, as we believe, with much fallacy, and some truth: yet even against the truth involved in them we see counter-considerations which far more than overbalance it. We must premise, that at present this wide and prolific theory is *only* a theory with the party by whom it is defended, since hitherto, at least, none of their practical measures involve adherence to this social creed. Our great moral indictment against it is that to carry it out consistently, it would supersede individual liberties and rights, by a social control that would not have sprung up from any natural root of custom, but would have been imposed by an arbitrary external authority; that it would require the power to relegate men from one trade to another, so superseding individual choice and aptitude, and introducing temptations to selfishness and monopoly far exceeding the moral dangers of competition; and that, in case it were not consistently carried out, and never wielded such a power, it would leave untouched the temptations of the present system while introducing new ones. Our economical indictment is that its successful operation must bring with it the economical dangers incident to monopoly, with which the Edinburgh Reviewer successfully charges it: and we shall attempt to show that the reply made to this charge has been futile. And further, we plead on behalf of the present system that, subject to the limitations we have already discussed, its moral evils are incidental, not necessary; temptations, not guilty conditions; and would be abolished by the Christian principles which the socialist system begins, according to Mr. Kingsley, with assuming.

To begin with the economical argument. The new socialism assumes with Sismondi that demand should regulate supply, instead of supply preceding and attempting to call forth demand; and therefore that the central association in each productive and distributive operation should first ascertain the labour *needed*, and proportion the supply to the need. Without this there could be no accuracy or even sense in talking of regulating supply by concert, judging on the demand. We think that there has been an unnecessary amount of scorn spent by the Economists on this principle; and that both Mr. Newman (p. 121) and the Edinburgh Reviewer regard it without foundation as intrinsically absurd. That

in all *old* trades the known previous demand does determine the supply brought into the market, there can be no doubt, though of course there is always a considerable margin left for chance-increases of demand. And we have no doubt that careful statistical tables of the average consumption and prices of the different staple articles of trade, and of the number of distinct centres of distribution to a given area of population, would afford very valuable data for the consideration of those proposing to enter these trades. Such considerations could of course be of no use in a new trade, where supply must gradually feel its way to the demand that it might permanently develope. Whatever we may admit in this way, however, we believe that the analogies on which the Socialists so much rely,* as the Government Offices, the Post-Office, the Army and Navy, and like institutions, for the advantage of an organized system in all the separate trades, are really fallacious. In such cases individual services, previously understood, are wanted and contracted for. Organization is always easy where this is the case: the duties are definite and simple, the agents and the remuneration can be definite also. But ordinary trade is a wide, and should be a very elastic system, having a capacity for self-adjustment to the varying wants, tastes, and conveniences of individuals, which cannot be calculated on beforehand, and need some discretion to answer, when they come. Those services only can be the subject of at once a widely organized and yet effective system that are simple and invariable in their outlines, so that transgression of duty, or incapacity for it, are speedily and distinctly betrayed. Such are the functions of letter-carriers, soldiers, sailors, and most of the government officers. The operations of trade are however too variable and too delicate to dispense with the direct superintendence of those personally interested in the result. Now what would be the effect of the vast trade-organization contemplated by the Socialist system? Obviously, if it is to exclude competition, to give power to central societies to decide when the demands of a trade are fully supplied, so that no more labour is required, and therefore to refuse admittance to new candi-

* Mr. Ludlow's Lecture, pp. 34, 35, &c.; and Christian Socialist Writings, *passim*.

dates. And if this were so, who can doubt that one of the greatest motives to ensure vigilance, activity, and careful work, would be removed, since these vast associations could defy competition outside them, and control its multiplication within? We have heard that in the middle ages the guild-monopolies actually produced this effect of comparatively wide carelessness as to the wants of the consumer, and the excellence of the goods he purchased. And obviously enough, the more dependent the consumer becomes on any one organized system of production or distribution, the less close need be the attention of the producer and distributor to understand and answer his wants. Moreover it is obvious that the system would tend to risk the benefit which the consumer would naturally derive from the improvements in production and distribution due to the skill and care of individuals. Prices being fixed by a central system, and competition excluded, the improver would usually alone reap the benefit, instead of dividing the benefit between himself and the public, as happens now. The most plausible side of the organizing theory of trade, is however the saving in distribution that might be thus reasonably expected. It is said, and we believe with much truth, that from the comparative ease of retail trades, from the slighter requisitions as to previous knowledge and practice, and from the usually smaller amount of needful capital, the multiplication of retail businesses has far exceeded that of productive operations, and quite outstripped our social needs; having sunk capital in the rent and fixtures of retail shops, that has been really spent only on abstracting custom from the hands of fellow-competitors, while it might and ought to have been productively employed. A very absurd cry has hence arisen against all middlemen, which Mr. Newman deservedly ridicules. Nevertheless we do not in the least doubt that the most beneficial use of trading capital, made even with the most scrupulous regard to the wants, time, and convenience of consumers, would show an enormous reduction in the capital spent on shop-fixtures and the various incidents to distribution. We concede willingly, therefore, that could the various trade operations be (on other grounds) consigned without injury to the management of central boards, there would probably ensue great saving in

this respect. Still we cannot understand how such stress is laid upon this, as if all the capital thus saved would infallibly be productively employed. In a country so overflowing with capital as England, this seems to us to be exceedingly far from the truth. If the only difficulty in our social problems were to ascertain that capital exists in England for productive operations, which is now spent unproductively, those problems would soon be solved. The real difficulty is to get the moral motive which will induce men so to employ it, when the rate of profit is so low. We really attach little or no importance, as regards the social condition of the lower classes, to the fact that by such means much capital would be saved, that *might* be productively employed. If it could be shown that it *would* be so employed, the importance of the discovery would be different. But even then we could regard it as no sufficient set-off against the risks and evils of trade-organizations endowed with a power to decide on the needful quantity of labour, which might easily become tyrannical, or innocently fall into the most pernicious blunders. The answer that has been attempted to the charge of the Edinburgh Review, that this kind of organization of trade, if successful, would set up again as many monopolies as there were organized trades exercising the power of limiting the supply of labour to the demand, seems to us absolutely futile. It is explained by Mr. Ludlow, and appears to have the sanction of Mr. Kingsley. The warrant against monopoly is to be the similar organization of all trades; which, it is asserted, will prevent the possibility of monopoly in any one. This mysterious consequence is thus explained (Mr. Ludlow's Lecture, p. 56):—

“ Suppose a village in England sufficiently remote from any great centre of population to forbid the easy influx of strangers in search of a living, and in which the various trades happen to be represented each by a single individual. There is one tailor, one shoemaker, one blacksmith, one butcher, one baker, and so forth. Each of these men will obviously have, strictly speaking, a monopoly of his own trade. But does it follow that this monopoly will be an evil one? that the prices charged will be exorbitant? * If the butcher

* Mr. Ludlow seems to think this exorbitance of price the only danger of monopoly. It is only one of many. His argument does not relate at all (even if it were good for what he intends) to those evils of monopoly which we have just discussed.

attempts to charge 2s. 6d. a-pound for meat, what is easier than for baker, shoemaker, smith, and tailor, to combine against him, and by virtue of their respective monopolies, associated and in harmony amongst themselves, but excited to competition and warfare by his selfishness, to force down his prices again? And will not the same apply in turn to each, if each in turn were to try the same mad experiment? But suppose, further, that instead of leaving each trader to fix his own prices under the sole check of the fear of adverse monopolies, all these several traders were to combine regularly into one body, which should, after mutual explanations, and by mutual consent, fix the terms upon which each member should dispose of his wares to the other, could there be any 'evils' in the monopoly of any, so far as respected all the other members of the combination? Now this is precisely what association, even in its present rude form, and under our feeble guidance, is attempting. It is a monopoly, I grant you; but it is the monopoly of all order and justice, against all iniquity and disorder. It is the monopoly of fair prices and living wages against false prices and starvation wages. It is a monopoly; but a monopoly which, instead of narrowing, seeks only to widen, its circle; which, if once it could take in this whole city, would not rest satisfied till it had taken in the whole country; if once this whole country, would grasp at the whole empire; if once the whole empire, would grasp at the whole world. We all know, says the [Edinburgh] Reviewer what monopoly means — 'a restricted market, a gigantic job, a final and inevitable smash.' Oh, the fearful monopoly, of the whole world selling to the whole world all the articles which the whole world had produced, at prices fixed with the whole world's consent! Oh, the 'restricted market!' Oh, the 'gigantic job!' Oh, the 'final and inevitable smash'—of all frauds and iniquities under the sun."

Now, in the first place it is obvious that no part of this argument has any application whatever to the prices charged to unproductive consumers, even though it were successful in showing that trade-prices would thus be kept below a monopoly height. The mode of reducing the monopolist-butcher to terms, might consist, perhaps, in the little village, in an injunction to charge the fraudulent man or any of his family, prices far above the ordinary market level: but this remedy could only apply where the butcher and his adherents could be at once personally identified. In the system of trade which this village market is intended to illustrate, monopolist-butchers could only be punished by raising prices as against all

purchasers at once,—a method of obtaining vengeance as awkward, perhaps, and as full of ruinous consequences, as the Chinese mode explained by Charles Lamb, of obtaining roast pork at the sacrifice of their habitations and all the fixtures therein contained. One might have thought that the failure of international attempts to secure reciprocity by vindictive tariffs, might have warned the Socialists of the similar impossibility of guarding against monopolies in trades by surrounding monopolies. Again, if power is given to trading associations to proportion the supply of labour to the demand, the values of their wares will depend on the quantity of labour that they choose to think necessary and admit. If this is really, to any extent, below the real wants of the market, the value of the manufacture will necessarily rise; and this need not betray itself by any diminution in the quantity of labour employed, but may be quite consistent with an increase: only if the increase is made more slowly than the increase of demand for the commodity (a thing very difficult for the public to test), the value of the commodity must necessarily arise, and the evils of monopoly begin. And supposing a council of trades, such as Mr. Ludlow wishes to have, determining on the relative exchange value of their various commodities, it would be impossible for the remaining trades to ensure the fair and just use of their power of regulating the amount of labour employed, by any one: nay, almost impossible for any one to be sure whether it were using its own power wisely and well. And thus the fair relative value of the respective articles of trade it would be almost impossible to determine: it would vary apparently with the various use made of this power of restricting the labour used in the various trades; and no trade would be content to accept as an equivalent in value from other trades, that which had fallen very much below what it received from the public at large. In truth there would be no way of regulating trades by a centralised system, unless there were a *natural* value for every article produced,—a thing which we have shown to be absurd. There are, indeed *limits* of natural value in certain cases; but the cost of production which alone can determine value, varies with the quantity and the cost of the labour em-

ployed; and once give an arbitrary power of restricting labour, and the cost of labour will vary immediately according to the use made of this power. We have not the least hesitation in saying that such trade-legislation as the Socialists seem to desire, would be mere legislation in the dark.

We think we have not shown ourselves blind to the dangers and evils of the present system. But the remedies for these evils are not to be found, we think, in taking the laws of commerce wholly into our own hands, and issuing a new constitution, but in setting ourselves resolutely against the special abuses and grievances that have been introduced. We have insight and power enough for this; to embark on a perfectly new region of positive legislation, like the French revolutionists, would be mere foolhardy adventure. In all that we have said, we have assumed that each trade would have the power of proportioning the labour it employed to the demand. But though this principle is uniformly asserted in the Socialist writings, we are not sure that they would wish to carry out practically the restriction of labour it would imply. At least they always seem to shrink from this point in their writings, and to take refuge in proving that all the labour that could ask employment might find it without over-production. This we believe to be practically erroneous. But it is not necessary to join issue on it, as we suppose they would admit that the time might soon come, when the trades would be overstocked with labourers, even if they are not now; unless new trades, and the versatility of English labour, increase far more rapidly than we have any right to expect. Now, when this happened, would they still go on admitting applicants into the trade or not? If the latter, we have already discussed the consequences. If the former, all the supposed benefit of organization vanishes at once, and competition must be the result. Not, perhaps, competition in prices, if the central association arbitrarily limited the prices; but, certainly, competition as to who should receive those prices, who should get the custom, where there was not custom enough to be adequately remunerative to all. And in this way all the dangers of the competitive system are brought back, with the added evil that consumers lose the

benefit of individual improvements and good management, since prices are fixed to a given inelastic rate; and the producers lose much of the incitement to improve, caused by the knowledge that they will otherwise be driven out of the market.

We have thus discussed the economical bearing of the vast proposal made by the new Socialist party: let us add a few words on its moral aspect. It seems to us to partake of the universal socialist error that we have illustrated from Plato, of making society organize individuals instead of waiting for individuals to organize themselves in society. It does not sufficiently deduce social arrangements from the natural and highest developments of individual life. Nothing could be a worse result, we conceive, than the compulsory power that trade-unions would thus be enabled to wield over the freedom of tradesmen. To make the theory anything better than a delusive substitute for competition, we have seen that these guilds must have the power to refuse admission to fresh associations of labourers or tradesmen, and so consign them to some other occupation. In this way individuals, or their friends for them, would lose the power of selecting the occupation most fitted to their capacities and moral nature, and so lose half the control over, and responsibility for their future career in life: * so that eminent aptitude in taste, skill, and circumstance, would constantly be thrown away; society

* The imminent danger of all socialist systems is everywhere, that they tend to substitute social influences too much for individual responsibilities. It would be, perhaps, hypercriticism in the present state of the dwellings of the poor to say anything in disparagement of the associative dwelling-houses that are so vastly superior to their present crowded rooms. But we cannot look upon them as the ultimate homes of the poor with any satisfaction. Parents should be able to choose completely the moral influences to which their children shall be exposed. The isolation of the family is a natural thing. Lodging-houses destroy much of this power and responsibility in parents. We are tempted to express here our sorrow that the Westminster Review (July 1851, Article I.) should have lent its authority, or rather that of a writer of great ability, and, we believe, high standing, to social influences having the same tendency, but reached from a point of view, as we think, far more dangerous. If women and mothers, as the writer advocates, are to have rights and duties, and occupations everywhere co-ordinate with men's, the family ties and moral influences of English homes must soon be dissolved. We fear that this is a result both foreseen and desired by the writer, whose conceptions of family bliss to be realized by the equal rights and similar occupations of a "strong-minded woman," united with a "strong-minded man" (p. 305), seem to us to contain as much painfully bad taste as imperfect moral insight.

deprived of the advantage it would have derived ; and individuals presented with a permanent excuse for all future worldly or moral failures in a career forced on them by necessity. It would thus sadly diminish the sense of individual independence, and we may add, that there would be great danger that men unnecessarily interdicted from one trade, by the error or selfishness of its ruling guild, and unfitted or unable to find admission into others, would swell the pauper-system of the country far beyond its needful extent. The moral evil of this is obvious enough. Mr. Kingsley trusts, for the counteraction of all these dangers in the social organizations for which he contends, to the Christian foundation on which they are to rise. Christian influences once planted in the heart, would dissipate the evils of the present system as well ; and there is nothing which his party have been more strenuous in denying than that they trust to these new organizations for *implanting* Christian influences. They reply, however, that the present system would not be modified and regulated, but necessarily annihilated, by the spread of practical Christianity. This assertion appears to us so untenable and paradoxical, that we are confident it can only have arisen with men who, when they name the word Competition, think not of its sober meaning, but of its vulgar abuses in this eager, selfish, and puffing commercial world. We have examined its economical origin ; we can now look at its moral and social meaning. Competition, like all other simply natural principles, is capable of being either low and immoral, indifferent or unmoral, or noble and holy, according to the other principles with which it comes into collision in life. It is in itself simply the assertion by any one of his right to seek on an equal footing with his fellow-men of similar station and like means of usefulness, his share (in proportion to his natural endowments and exertions) of the advantages open to them. If this claim be made when, from the circumstances of the case, it must end in simply taking one's share out of another's hands, who needs it more, then it is mean and wrong. This is, of course, not the normal state of trade-competition, which generally takes place where it is believed that there is some want in society which the new competitor can best supply, that part of his business will spring up specially for him, and that even that

part which he withdraws from others, is only withdrawn because he can more completely meet the needs and convenience of those who give it him. The man who would scruple at such a kind of competition, would scruple to secure for himself a good place at a theatre, by surpassing others in exertion and skill; in short, he would be obliged to make life one long apology for his inconvenient intrusions upon space where many would willingly have spared him, and would die as a suppliant, with leaden remorse on his heart, imploring forgiveness of society for the various possibilities that his existence might have spoiled. We confess that we have no sympathy with so mawkish a moral nature as this morbid fear of any kind of competition implies. There is nothing of Christian manliness about it, and it deserves no better answer than a caricature such as Dickens would give. It must be recollected too that the *right* to take an equal place with his compeers in the advantages and privileges of society, becomes an imperative duty, when a man has (as is generally the case) others dependent on him, whose happiness (and not that of his fellow-men at large) is entrusted to his care. But there may be cases even in trade, as there have always been in political life, when competition may become a high and honourable duty. Where a selfish and immoral system, monopoly or otherwise, has degraded the morals of a trade, and seriously injured the interests of society, it becomes a lofty function to compete with and overthrow it. Such is the case of free-labour as opposed to slave-labour in America; and be it remembered that a principle which can *ever* be noble, cannot be *intrinsically* base, but must have intermediate moral values (those, namely, of the ordinary trade) where it is simply natural and legitimate.

We have already exhausted our limits, without any examination of the principles and prospects of the new co-operative associations set on foot by the new Socialist party. We have however little to say upon them, except that we have the warmest interest in them, and the most sanguine hopes for their success. We have wished to examine the distinctive creed of the new party as to the organization of trade. These associations are quite in harmony with all the principles of economical science; and moreover enlist warmly the moral sympathies of those who have seen in

the unhappy and not always merely apparent antagonism between the interests of capital and labour, the temptation to those misinterpretations, hard exaggerations, and unwarranted caricatures of economical science, some of which we have attempted to expose. Nothing, we think with Mr. Newman, can be more dangerous than the hand and mouth system; nothing more desirable than that labourers should cease altogether to be a distinct class from capitalists, so as to lose the dread of being compelled ever to capitulate with employers when starvation would be the alternative of refusal. All the dangers of the competitive system would be lessened, and some removed, if such co-operative associations became the ordinary constituent elements of our commercial world. We believe that such associations are destined to be a principal medium by which the large labouring class are to raise themselves into a class of small capitalists; and we feel some confidence that there is no inherent difficulty, except the common conservative fears, in extending these associations from the distributive trades to the larger manufacturing operations. At the same time we must say that at present we believe only the higher class of labourers to be fitted for this system. Such partnerships involve much moral discipline and self-control. To act harmoniously with a number of others is always difficult; and to submit implicitly to a democratically chosen head (and implicit submission alone can render the system effective) is still more difficult. Moreover, we are bound to say that the Socialist tone, which implies that it is *obligatory* on the trading and working classes to join such associations, and wrong to stand aloof in their separate competition, is altogether false and injurious. No doubt it is for the benefit of their class and society at large, that they should encourage such associations, as far as is possible, consistently with other duties. But their first duties are not to society at large, nor even to their class, but to those immediately dependent on them. And if care for these renders it wiser, on any account, to remain unconnected with such societies, it is their duty still to remain in their commercial isolation. These associations can only effectually recommend themselves by proving (as we believe they will be able to prove) their superior prudential advantages over the state of isolated traders and operatives.

Here we must close this discussion, already protracted beyond desirable limits. In doing so, however, we would guard ourselves against a misconstruction that some of our criticisms may have tended to originate. We would not have it said that we oppose to Socialist theories an intense individualism that considers the State simply an aggregate of individuals. We do indeed charge the Socialists with that vagueness and unreality of view which arises from studying social morality without sufficiently individualizing its problems, without asking the distinct verdict of the personal conscience, notwithstanding all the complexity and qualifications this introduces, on all its vexed questions. This seems to us the reason why many of their social canons are at once so sweeping and so vague, never true without large exceptions, and even when true, scarcely clear enough for moral guidance. But we are very far from advocating political Individualism. That only is Individualism, in the sense of adherence to the voluntary system, which gives too much play to individual *wills*, and acknowledges no social organization to which they ought to be subject. All that we have insisted on is, that the laws of that social organization should be drawn fresh from the provisions contained for it in each man's individual nature, and not from the loose maxims current amongst men who study society first, and themselves afterwards. We trust at least that we have not altogether failed in drawing the line between these Socialists and the ultra-economists, whose opposite error lies, not in losing sight of the individual life, but in mutilating it; in solving economic problems by suppressing their complexities, in first omitting the moral premises and then eliciting immoral results. In both cases an unreality of thought equally injurious is the consequence, since the social theory is in the one case apparently above, in the other really below, what men can admit as the actual and noble law by which they ought to shape their lives. And it is equally destructive of perfect self-sincerity, whether we quietly permit our conception of social duty to escape from our living grasp, wrapt in the garments of a mystic church; or allow it to lose its authority over us, by secretly confessing it too selfish for practice, though not too selfish for thought.

ART. II.—SERPENT WORSHIP AND THE AGE OF STONEHENGE.

1. *American Archaeological Researches, No. I.—The Serpent Symbol and the Worship of the Reciprocal Principles of Nature in America.* By E. G. Squier, A.M. New York, 1851.
2. *Cyclops Christianus.* By A. Herbert. London, 1849.

THE beguiling of Eve was the first, but by no means the last, piece of mischief which the Serpent has inflicted on mankind. We reckon among the evils clearly traceable to his spite against the human race, the many unprofitable volumes which he has caused to be written respecting himself and his operations. We might fill a page with the titles of treatises on Ophiolatry, in which erudition and fancy, uncontrolled by logic, have expatiated over the world, ancient and modern, in search of his trail. The list would begin with the high-priest of Byblus, Sanchoniathon, well known to the readers of the *Vicar of Wakefield*, who, according to Eusebius, wrote a treatise called *Ethothia*, in which he described the qualities of the Serpent, and the causes of his deification; and might end with the Rev. J. B. Deane, the author of "*Serpent Worship*."

Mr. Squier is known as a careful and intelligent inquirer into the antiquities of America—for such there are, though we are accustomed to suppose that every thing in the Western world is new. In a former publication he has shown that long before its discovery, a large part of the Mississippi Valley was tenanted by a people further advanced in civilization than the existing Indians, and holding a middle place between the hunting tribes and the semi-civilized Mexicans. He has also carefully examined the ancient remains of the State of New York, but finds in these traces of a population so closely resembling the present Indians, that no high antiquity can be ascribed to it. The subject of his present book is one respecting which archaeologists and divines have run wild in their theories, but he has not allowed himself to be infected with their enthusiasm, and has been content to collect facts without building hypotheses

upon them. It has been usual from the circumstance, that the serpent has been an object of worship in very distant parts of the globe, to infer that this worship must have been communicated from one to the other. Mr. Bryant could trace the steps by which it was propagated by colonies of Cuthæan and Ammonian priests over all the ancient world from India to Britain. Mr. Squier is more cautious and philosophical. Having quoted a remark of Alexander Humboldt's, that we find in a world which we call new those ancient institutions, those religious notions, and that style of building which seem in Asia to indicate the dawn of civilization, he adds:—

“The conclusion from this discovery would naturally be, that these institutions, notions and monuments are founded in an original connection, especially as such a conclusion is in strict harmony with popular prejudices. But the philosophical mind will hesitate in accepting it, without inquiring how far similar conditions and like constitutions, mental, moral and physical, may serve to approximate religions and monuments to a common or cognate type. The opinions of former scholars cannot be taken as conclusive in this inquiry, for at no previous period of the world's history have the materials for prosecuting it been so abundant as now. * * * In pursuing my investigations, I have sought only to arrive at truth, however much it may conflict with preconceived notions, or what are often called ‘established opinions.’ I have no system to sustain, no creed to defend; but entertain as many hypotheses as there are possibilities, and am ready to accept or reject according to the weight of evidence and the tendency of facts.”—*Preface*, p. viii., ix.

The theory respecting Serpent Worship which has been almost universally adopted in this country, connects it with the Temptation and the Fall. Although no agency of an Evil Spirit is even hinted at in Genesis, or in any other part of Scripture, it has been taken for granted that the Devil took the form of this animal, and following up his first success, caused himself to be worshipped far and wide, that he might seduce men's hearts from the true God. If the objection were raised, that it was not likely the descendants of Adam should worship the symbol of a mischief so deadly, that nothing less than the incarnation of Deity could repair it, the answer was ready—they worshipped him in order to appease him and avert the evils which they dreaded from his malignity. This is not satis-

factory, and we think that the various and opposite qualities with which the serpent is, or was supposed to be, endowed, will account for its appearing sometimes in a benign, sometimes in a malevolent character. It is in truth a multiform symbol. In Egypt it was the emblem of the benevolent god Kneph or Agathodæmon; the kings wore it in their crowns in honour of its sagacity, the good aspect of that same subtilty by which it succeeded in tempting our great progenitrix. Its extraordinary vitality (the ancients said it never died, except by violence) made it a natural emblem of the healing art; it was the companion of Esculapius; and his descendants, who are among us to this day, have adopted it as one of their insignia, indicating, we presume, their ability to cure, and not their licence to kill. The poisonous qualities, however, which belong to many of the tribe, make it just as fit an emblem of death as of life. In the East it is far more venomous than in the West. To the Jews it was, with all creeping things, unclean; it was held in abhorrence and destroyed by the professors of the Magian religion; in India it was dedicated to the terrific deities of death and evil. And many of its uses in ancient art, we believe, had no symbolism at all in them. The gracefulness of a serpentine curve had been perceived, long before Hogarth wrote upon the line of beauty. The Greek and Roman ladies who bound their wrists with bracelets in the form of a serpent, thought neither of the monster Python nor the beneficent Genius, but adopted a fashion at once graceful and com-
modious.

Mr. Squier has brought together many curious circumstances of resemblance between the superstitions of the Old World and the New, especially as regards the serpent. In Mexico it appears chiefly as a representative of the principle of evil, an appropriate companion to the bloody and horrid rites which bear so conspicuous a place in the religion of that country. In Central America it is also of very frequent occurrence. These things, however, are sufficiently known from the works of Humboldt and Stephens. The really original part of his book is that in which he describes the earthworks of America, which are constructed with a resemblance to the form of a serpent, and compares them with those Druidical structures in this country, in

which Stukeley and Bryant and others have found traces of Ophite worship.

Among the earthworks of the Ohio Valley, there is one situated on Brush Creek, near the north line of Adams County, Ohio. Occupying its summit is an embankment in the form of a serpent, its head resting near the point of the hill, and its body winding back for near seven hundred feet in graceful undulations, terminating in a triple coil at the tail. The entire length, if extended, would be upwards of one thousand feet. The neck of the serpent is stretched out and slightly curved, and its mouth is opened wide, as if in the act of swallowing or ejecting an oval figure which rests partially within the distended jaws. In Iowa is found a similar earthwork 1,004 feet in length, representing a serpent extended; and in the same district a series of mounds, arranged in a serpentine form, two miles and a half in length. Near the junction of the St. Peter's with the Mississippi is a large conical mound, sixty feet in diameter and eighteen feet high, surrounded by a circle 365 feet in circumference. Entwined around this circle, in a triple coil, is an embankment, in the form of a serpent, 2,310 feet in length. It is eighteen feet in diameter at the centre of the body, but diminishes in just proportion towards the head and tail.

Our first conclusion on reading these descriptions would be, that they indicated the worship of the serpent, as having prevailed among the vanished races who once peopled this valley. But if this be so, the honour has been shared with various other animals who had certainly nothing to do with the Fall. An effigy in the form of an alligator occurs near Granville, Licking County, Ohio. Close by one of the gigantic serpents already described, there is the representation of an elk, in length 195 feet; and in Wisconsin and the extreme North-West are great numbers of mounds, bearing the forms of animals of various kinds, with conical mounds and lines of embankment. Either, therefore, the inhabitants of this country made these stupendous representations of animals, without any religious purpose or symbolical meaning, or the serpent was only one among many so honoured, and therefore has no special significance.

Mr. Squier finds strong confirmation of his opinion, that

the serpent mounds in America are connected with the mystical character of this animal, from the existence of similar mounds and rows of stones in the Old World, whose antiquaries refer them to the Druidical religion. Abury, in Wiltshire, first fully described by Dr. Stukeley, and by him considered as a Druidical temple, consists of a large circle 1,400 feet in diameter, within which were circular concentric rows of stones. Extending on either hand from this grand central structure were parallel lines of huge upright stones, constituting on each side avenues upwards of a mile in length, and forming the body of the serpent. His head was represented by an oval structure, consisting of two concentric lines of upright stones. At Stanton-Drew (in the last syllable of which the etymologist sees a lurking *Druid*) is a structure somewhat similar to Abury, the plan of which Mr. Deane says is that of the Ophite hierogram, the central circle being 378 feet by 345 in diameter. Two other circles are joined to the central one, by avenues of stones, one rectilinear, the other curved. That these elaborate arrangements of stones were designed for a religious use there can be little doubt; *on paper* Abury has something of a serpentine form, but it is by no means clear that it had any mystical reference. We find in precisely similar circumstances rectilinear avenues, as at Merivale Bridge between Tavistock and Moreton Hampstead, and in this case, as at Abury and Stanton-Drew, there is a central enclosure of a circular or oval form. Now if Stanton-Drew is an Ophite hierogram, what is Merivale Bridge? We know the ingenuity of symbolists, and should not be surprised to be told, in explanation, that the straight lines represent the serpent slain, and with his coils relaxed by death.

A formidable antagonist to the Ophite theory has arisen in Mr. Herbert, the author of *Cyclops Christianus*. In the first place he denies that the structures or arrangements of stones which we commonly call Druidical really belong to that superstition. Cæsar attributes no such works to the Druids: Tacitus describing the warfare waged against them by the Romans speaks only of groves being cut down. *Cerrig-y-drudion* means "graves of the valiant," and has nothing to do with the Druids. Stanton-Drew, on the authority of Collinson's Somerset, derived

its name from Drogo or Drew de Stanton, a descendant of Robert de Stanton, temp. Hen. II. The argument so much insisted upon by Stukeley and his followers to prove that the works on Salisbury Plain are ante-Roman,—that the Roman road to Bath turns out of its way to avoid Silbury Hill,—rests on a misapprehension or falsification of Stukeley, who gave it a fictitious curve to support his theory. What he asserted in the singular of the *Via Badonica* his successors have enunciated in the plural, laying it down that “the Roman roads” in Britain avoid the Druidical mounds and circles. So error grows, “*vires que acquirit eundo.*”

Mr. Herbert has his own theory respecting Stonehenge and the other structures of the same character. He has unfortunately not the faculty of clear exposition, and we profess ourselves utterly unable to estimate the force of the Bardic quotations, which with his commentary upon them occupy so large a part of the *Cyclops Christianus*.* We learn, he says, from Gildas (Epist., c. 19), that between the departure of the Romans and the establishment of the Saxons in Britain, a period of extraordinary prosperity intervened, in which not only luxury and vice prevailed, but “the hatred of truth and its asserters, and the love of falsehood and its fabricators, the adoption of evil for good, the veneration of wickedness instead of benevolence, the desire of darkness instead of the Sun, the reception of Satan for an angel of light. Kings were anointed, not by God, but by those who were more cruel than others; and soon again slain by the anointers, not upon an inquiry of the truth, others yet fiercer being anointed.” In these words Mr. Herbert sees an allusion, purposely left obscure, to a temporary re-establishment of the ancient British Religion, during the interval between the Roman and the Saxon sway. The tradition respecting the stones of Stonehenge, that they were brought by enchantment from Kildare in Ireland, he supposes to be a mythical expression of the fact, that Druidism, having taken refuge in Ireland during the ascendancy of the Romans, returned thence on their de-

* Why he has so denominated his book we do not understand, as he does not suppose Stonehenge to be a Christian work. But Polyphemus is no bad emblem of a theorizing antiquary, who sees only out of one eye.

pasture, established itself on Salisbury Plain, as a kind of ecclesiastical metropolis, and raised there and elsewhere the structures which have so exercised the ingenuity of antiquaries. The lateness of its erection explains the mechanical skill which Stonehenge manifests, inexplicable among a people so rude as the Britons before the Roman Conquest. Ambresbury (now Abury) was not only the religious centre of a federation, in which Christianity and Druidism were strangely blended, but the place to which the national councils were summoned, and where rites, festive and religious, were celebrated. Its name retains that of Ambrosius, the Emrys of the Welsh Triads, to whom one of the three mighty architectural achievements of the Isle of Britain is attributed. The great Druidical work of Carnac in Bretagne is nearly of the same age, having been raised by those who migrated from Britain in the middle of the fifth century after Christ, or at all events, subsequently to the reign of Maximus, in the latter part of the fourth.

Mr. Herbert is not the first who has called in question the ante-Roman date of Stonehenge. Mr. Rickman, in the 28th volume of the *Archæologia*, pp. 399—419, has produced some arguments to show that it was erected after the establishment of the Roman power. These are, its vicinity to the *Via Badonica*, which he thinks too close to have been casual; the distances of the different parts, which appear to have been derived from the Roman mile; and a resemblance between the great earthen circus and a Roman amphitheatre. These are slight reasons, and have produced little conviction. Mr. Herbert's theory also is open to very serious objections. We cannot find more than half a century from the abandonment of Britain by the Romans, to the conquest of Kent by the Saxons, even allowing to Mr. Herbert that it was in the first and not the third consulship of Ætius, that the "Groans of the Britons" were addressed to him. Into this narrow space we must compress the return of Druidism from Ireland, a new organization of the kingdom of which Ambresbury was the capital, an impure mixture of Christianity with Druidism, the erection of Stonehenge and its dependencies, and, if we rightly apprehend Mr. Herbert, all the circles, rocking-stones, altars and other works commonly called

Druidical. Truly these must have been stirring times. And while these great works were going on, the kingdom, according to Gildas, was distracted by civil war and the frequent depositions of anointed kings.

Milbourne was called "the fairest of critics," because, having found fault with Dryden's Virgil, he published a Translation of his own. Reviewers do not usually give authors such an opportunity of revenge, but having rejected Mr. Herbert's theory we will venture on a suggestion of our own. The evidence of archæology seems to us quite at variance with the common opinion of the extent to which Christianity prevailed in Roman Britain. That the Roman soldiers were Pagans to the last is fairly presumable from the circumstance, that no Christian emblems are ever found with articles known to be Roman in the camps or towns which they occupied. What was the prevailing religion of the Britons themselves? Tertullian (adv. Jud., c. 7) tells us that Christ had subjugated parts of Britain, into which the Romans could not penetrate; but we distrust the generalities of the African Father. Mr. Hallam has lately exposed the mythe of the conversion of King Lucius; the interval between the departure of the Romans and the conversion of the Saxons is equally devoid of archæological evidence for the existence of the Christian religion, whence we may fairly infer that it prevailed to no great extent. The account of Augustine's mission implies that except in Wales it was little known among the population of the island, which must still have been in great measure British. Is it not probable, then, that the native religion was that of the great mass of the people under the Roman dominion, notwithstanding the mention of Christian bishops, and that the remains which we call Druidical are their works? Of course we do not believe that the Romans would permit the establishment of Druidism in its hierarchical pride; but having once broken its tyranny and reduced it into subordination to the civil power, they might, in accordance with their usual policy, allow the people to practise its rites, as far as they did not contravene the law. So we tolerate and even foster the religions of India, though we have put down Suttees, and no longer allow fanatics to throw themselves under the wheels of Juggernaut's car. Mr. Rickman pronounces

that tools of bronze were unequal to the work of fashioning the trilitha of Stonehenge. Now it appears that the German nations, who had not been conquered by the Romans, had not the use of iron till their great migration. We may presume that Britain was equally ignorant of it till subdued by the Romans, and therefore a work which presupposes its use cannot have been anterior to that event. The negative argument from the absence of all mention of Stonehenge, before the Saxon times, presses equally on every hypothesis.

ART. III.—LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ZUMPT.

De Caroli Timothei Zumptii Vita et Studiis Narratio Aug. Wilh. Zumptii. Accedunt Caroli Timothei Orationes Latinæ Sex. Pp. 197. Berolini, 1851.

A LATIN Biography is an unusual phenomenon in these days, even in Germany. It would be a mark of pedantry, if its subject were a man whose life had been spent in action, or who had gained reputation in modern literature and science. But as a record of one whose days and nights were devoted to the Latin language, antiquities and history, and who lived more in the Roman world than his own, it is perfectly appropriate. The Lives of Hemsterhuys by Ruhnken, of Ruhnken by Wyttenbach, and of Wyttenbach by Mahne, have long been the delight of scholars, and have furnished some of the best specimens of modern Latinity. Zumpt will not take rank among philologists with these great lights of the 18th century, but he has rendered services to learning which well deserve a memorial, and in moral qualities he was not inferior to any of them. He has been fortunate in having a biographer who, as his nephew and son-in-law, knew him intimately, and who shows by his own mastery of Latin style how competent he is to estimate his uncle's merits.

C. G. Zumpt (he latinized his name of Gottlob into Timotheus) was born in Berlin, of parents in the middle rank of life, in 1792, and was educated in the Gymnasia in that city, of the studies and discipline of which he was accustomed to give no very flattering account. We transcribe his biographer's description of the mathematical lecturer in one of them, which may serve as a specimen of his Latinity.

"Mathematici magistri, hominis alioquin non indocti atque eorum maxime genere quos quidam ingeniosos appellare solent, discipulorum contemptio atque incuria vix fidem nunc videtur posse invenire. Sed narrandum tamen quod Zumptius multique alii sibi accidisse sæpe questi sunt. Etenim ad speciem honestam servandam

justo sane ille tempore ad scholas veniebat, sed confabulans cum paucis qui urbanitate ejus delectarentur, tempus terebat, dum altera horæ pars præterierat. Tum serio rem agere incipiebat, sed non cum omnibus, non ut interrogaret, ut excitaret, ut responderet, ut quicquam denique eorum, quæ magistrum decent, tractaret. Verum pauci quidam hominem circumstabant, studiosi mathematicorum, demonstrantique et in tabula scribenti operam dabant, reliqui, si aderant, quicquid placuisset agebant, vel fabulis legendis occupati, vel si quid omnino serii temptarent, quæ ad alias scholas opus erant meditantes. Ut tres horæ partes consumptæ erant, egregius magister, tamquam alter Juppiter, capite annuebat discipulis, significans nimirum, defunctum se esse institutione. Ac consimilis fere reliquarum scholarum erat disciplina, quam paucis exemplis demonstrare satis videbatur."

The youth of Zumpt fell in the calamitous days of Prussia, after the battle of Jena, when the University of Halle had been broken up by the French, and that of Berlin was not yet founded. He repaired therefore, in 1809, for academical instruction to Heidelberg, performing the journey of twenty days on foot. Creuzer and Boeckh were the principal philologists of this University, the latter only in the beginning of his career; but already giving promise of the extraordinary powers and attainments which in maturer age have placed him at the head of the scholars of Germany. Having remained here a year, he returned to Berlin, just at the time of the inauguration of the new university, in which he spent two years. Berlin was in a state well fitted to excite the ardour of a mind like Zumpt's, and assist in its development. The university had been founded in a liberal spirit, and eminent men from every part of Germany had been brought together to fill its various departments. The spirit of the nation had been fully aroused after the stunning fall of its military defeat, and finding as yet no vent in action directed itself with great energy towards literature and science. F. A. Wolf held a conspicuous place among the philologists of the Berlin university; he had not then fallen into those habits of indolent self-indulgence which rendered his latter days useless and disreputable. Zumpt attached himself with ardour to his instructions, and was early pointed out by him as one who would become distinguished in Latin criticism and eloquence. He began his public

life as a teacher in the Friederico-Werderan Gymnasium, having then just completed his twentieth year, on an annual salary of 130 dollars. The rector offered him 120, which he declined as too small, and being asked to name his terms demanded ten more!

His biographer gives a minute and therefore instructive account of the difficulties with which he had to contend, in learning the practical art of education and establishing his authority as a teacher. The question which soon arises when a new hand takes the reins—who is to be master—was settled between him and his pupils after one or two attempts at insubordination. The leading principle of his conduct towards them was truthfulness, and this, aided by their knowledge of his eminent qualifications, his zeal for their improvement, and his grave, firm and self-possessed temper, secured him both their attachment and their respect. An anecdote which we have heard him relate shows how skilfully he could deal with those sudden manifestations of the *esprit de corps*, in which juvenile feeling sometimes breaks forth. He had found it necessary for some delinquency to condemn a pupil to the *carcer*, the scholastic prison, which in Germany supplies the place of birch and cane. Sympathising for some reason with the culprit, the whole school rose up and demanded to go to prison with their comrade. "Very well," replied Zumpt, "but it must be in succession—one to-day and another to-morrow." The self-inflicted imprisonment did not go on beyond the third day. In such outbreaks there is usually a generous feeling, expanded by temporary heat beyond all due bounds. It would be increased by violence or even contempt, but if a ludicrous aspect can be quietly given to it, it collapses at once, as a few drops of cold water condense a large volume of steam.

In 1818 Zumpt published the first edition of his Grammar, a work which has made his name known wherever the Latin language is studied. Germany was not so deplorably ill provided in this respect as England, but the Grammar of Bröder, which was chiefly in use, though furnished with a full collection of examples, was very deficient in the enunciation of the rules and discrimination of the different ages of Latinity. The fulness and precision

with which the formal part of the grammar was treated by Zumpt, and the clearness with which the rules of syntax were laid down, were soon recognised by the public as giving his work a vast superiority over all others; it was very generally adopted in the Gymnasias of Germany, and translated into English, French, Polish and Russian. Before his death it had reached a ninth edition. To enlarge and improve it was the constant study of his life, and the additions which he made were so numerous, that it may be doubted whether its copiousness did not in the end rather impair its utility as a manual. Its influence on the system of scholastic teaching in this country must not be measured by the extent to which it has been adopted in schools. To induce Eton or Westminster to lay aside their grammars would be as difficult as to procure a revision of the Articles; but the notes by which they are now accompanied, and the oral comments of the masters, show the influence of the more philosophical principles which Zumpt has made familiar to us.

Of his other publications the most considerable is his edition of the Verrine orations of Cicero. It is chiefly critical. Zumpt had formed his ideal of the philologist from the writings of the Dutch critics, and belonged to the school of Ruhnken and Wolf, rather than of Heyne. He thought the first and highest duty of an editor to be the exhibition of his author's text in the utmost purity to which it could be brought, by the careful collation and estimate of MSS., and the exercise of what has been called the *divining faculty* of criticism, which is nothing more than rapid perception, the result of long familiarity with an author and a thorough appreciation of his style. This branch of philology is the easiest to ridicule but the most difficult to practise, and those who have excelled in it are the men whom posterity regards as the great masters of their art. It must not be supposed, however, that Zumpt was ignorant of what may be called the material part of philology. His Dissertations on the Population of the Ancient World, *De Legibus Judiciisque Repetundarum*, and several others, show that he was well versed in antiquities. Still it is true that grammar, criticism and style were his proper field. Wolf pronounced that himself and Zumpt were the only men in Berlin who could write Latin, and

we know that scholars of first-rate eminence did not venture to produce their Latinity before the public, till it had undergone his revision.

He became in succession a teacher in other Gymnasias in Berlin, and ultimately Professor of History in the Military College, and of Latin Eloquence in the University. His domestic life was happy. The kindness of his nature, hidden at first by a somewhat *brusque* manner, and the perfect sincerity and consistency of his character, procured him many valuable friendships. His incessant labours, however, undermined his constitution, and brought on a premature decay; and for some time before his death he had become entirely blind. Against this calamity, so grievous to a man of letters, he bore up cheerfully and energetically, and by the help of an amanuensis completed his edition of Q. Curtius.* He died at Carlsbad in 1849. The manner of his dismissal shall be described by his biographer.

"Præterierat major pars mensis Junii, ipsi quidem satis jucunde; videbatur enim valetudinem paulatim emendare neque medici expedire putabant naturam mali quo laborabat ostendendo spem omnem adimere. Solito autem jucundior fuerat dies a. d. viii. Kal. Iul. Adierat visendi causa post prandium familiaris quidam vetustissima consuetudine cum illo conjunctus, sermones fuerant et cum hoc et cum suis hilares, pleni caritatis, pleni consiliorum ac spei. Tum tempestive in lectum sese recepit, noctemque satis quiete nec moleste transegit. Mane postridie ejus dici expergefactus circa horam sextam, ubi aquam bibendam sumpsit, quasi ad dormiendum sese composuit. Discessit igitur ab lecto quæ cum eo erat uxor fidelissima, ne dormire cupientem interpellaret; ille ut corpus composuerat, sine ulla doloris significatione neque ulla omnino voce edita, subito nervorum defectu extinctus est. Neque uxor animam excessisse sensit, adeo corpus nihil ex solito aspectu mutatum dormientis speciem præbebat; ipsi nos cum divinatione quadam mala, ut ægrotantem consolaremur domo exiiti ad aquas Carolinas properassemus, ubi tribus fere horis post advenimus, jussique leniter ingredi ad lectum accessimus, quid accidisset cognovimus."

A true Euthanasia! and we echo the concluding words of the biographer, "Have, pia anima, nosque ad imitationem tuarum virtutum incende."

* During this time he also edited Sallust and Four Books of Livy for the Chambers's of Edinburgh, and was engaged on Horace, as a part of the same series at the time of his death.

ART. IV.—CASA GUIDI WINDOWS.

Casa Guidi Windows. A Poem. By Elizabeth Barrett Browning. London: Chapman and Hall. 1851.

OLD things appear new to new minds. Here is an English visitor to Italy sufficiently read in the political history of the country, declaring her own part in the last of the three European Hopes and Disappointments which Italy has caused, by its rise and fall, within thirty years. An inveterate and incurable, because well-grounded, dissatisfaction with their present condition, makes the Italians always ready, on any occasion, to burst forth into a practical protest, whether in a well or an ill judged manner, against its continuance. God has given to nations the same species of vital tenacity which he has given to individuals: once alive, neither man nor people will give up a proper existence without an intense and oft-renewed struggle. They die very hard. To kill a nation is an immense undertaking. The symbolists need not go to so local and temporary an affair as the draining and cultivation of the Peloponnesus, for the interpretation of the Fable of the Hydra. The Hydra is National existence, the peculiarity of whose numerous heads is that for every one cut off *two* immediately supply its place, unless the sources of the fresh life be absolutely burnt up with fire; and that the *centre head is immortal*. We may tell Austria and Russia that their combat is in vain, and that the prestige of the Heracleian success is not theirs, though the instructive symbol of the Heracleian labour may be taken to themselves. These struggles, though ending in the defeat of the peoples, are not vanity—the series of the failures does not lessen but increase the certainty of the final triumph. The Italian struggles are not so heroic or so destructive as those of Poland and Hungary, but, coming at certain intervals, they revive to each generation the consciousness of the fact, and the conclusions to which the fact leads, that Italy is not part of Austria, and that Italians have not ceased to be one among the distinct peoples and nationalities of the world. Thus, then, the rise, and slaughters,

and weary imprisonments, and failure of 1821, the similar though stiller features of 1830, and the wider sweep of the same events and feelings in 1848, are not in vain. They are the national protests renewed at intervals—so that each generation shall make and feel them afresh, and grow up under their influence—and they gather momentum and significance every time they are made. The last struggle, too, has this hopeful peculiarity. It has been indigenous, and example-giving—not extraneous and example-taking. In 1821, it was the revolution of Spain that supplied courage and pretext to Naples and Piedmont; in 1830 it was that of France. But in 1848 Italy herself, nay, that power in her which was supposed to be the immoveable centre of corruption and despotism, rose spontaneously, and it was Rome—it was the Italian Papacy—that sent the ferment and the spirit of just reforms through the nations of Europe.

Though therefore the old features recur—though frightened and politic princes play the same lying, cowardly parts at first, and the same treacherous and despotic parts at last—though the Austrian comes in at last and settles the matter as usual—though Italians begin with the same brave cries, and end in the same submissive silence—though the tailor and the sign-painter and the haberdasher are the media through which they most successfully show to the world and to each other their love of freedom, and desire of self-government—and though the same excess, childishness and ignorance, bring back the old victims to the old yoke, which is easily put on them again, when they are hungry and dispirited, and want quiet and comfortable quarters again, yet the movement of 1848 is the most important and hopeful of any yet, and must necessarily have successors.

It is not our purpose to enter upon that tolerably well-worn subject. We have to do with a Poem by a Lady, not the programme or resumé of a Politician. Mrs. Browning takes advantage of her residence in Florence at the rise and the fall of the revolutionary curtain, to tell us what she saw and felt on both occasions; and very pleasantly she tells her interesting story. But we have several faults, notwithstanding, to find with her Poem—how could we be critics if we had not? Its first great defect lies

not in the dissimilarity of its two parts, but in their too great resemblance. We wish the apology for "the discrepancy" between them had been more needed. One of two things is certain to our mind, either that on revision the writer has bated the warm breath of hope and gladness with which her first part was originally surrounded, or that she never felt any really poetical enthusiasm in reference to the state of things she described. There is a qualified, hesitating, dubious, thoughtful faith in the possibility of a future for Italy, which shows that the prophet had the benefit of subsequent events to guide and sway the tone of her prophecy, or that she never felt the prophetic furor at all. The idea of a twofold Poem, the first part burning with hope and enthusiastic faith, a really "exultant prophecy," and the second drenched in the tears of indignant and sorrowful disappointment, would have involved a "discrepancy" which there would be no chance of the reader finding "painful." It is the sameness of the level on which the hope, prepared to be disappointed, of the first part, and the hope actually disappointed in the second, take their stand, that destroys the poetry and the effect of the intended and probably actual contrast. Of the two leaders to whom she looked up with patriotic hope in the first part, the Pope and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, she takes great and successful pains to show that from the first nothing really free and great could possibly be expected; and of the second she indulged a faint hope that he was converted, from his careful face, the reported tear in his eye, and his introduction of his children to the crowd—the first two being very natural to a man agitated by a revolution, and not knowing how he should suppress it, and the last being a mere royal art. It is evident that the chief reason for which Mrs. Browning trusts the Grand Duke and distrusts the Pope, is that she was near the one, and was, in common with the people, the victim of his royal play; whereas she was away from the other, and the influence of that personal attraction which in the Pope's case was far greater. Had she looked out of Corso windows in Rome, instead of Casa Guidi windows in Florence, had she seen the Pope's tearful benignant countenance, and witnessed the wave of his benedictory hand, and the kneeling, weeping, and confiding people, her faith

would have been changed. She would have thought and believed little or nothing of the Grand Duke, but would have had great hopes of the Pope. Turin windows would have made a difference again in favour of Charles Albert. People who wish to remain undeceived by royal shows must be near them every day or altogether removed from them. The unhappy medium is fatal to everybody. To see is to believe. William Penn could not resist the royal James, seen now and then, and exercising the blandishment of royalty. Had he kept away from court and never seen the King, he would have been a thorough anti-jacobite. How very natural, then, in our authoress to write and feel—

“Nor was it ill, when Leopoldo drew
His little children to the window-place,
He stood in at the Pitti, to suggest
They, too, should govern as the people willed.”

She “liked his face”—“the forehead’s build”—“mild and sad,” and “careful nobly”—this of a man in reference to whom, for twenty years or more, the only variation of feeling on the part of his subjects, has been the difference of the proportions of their contempt and their hatred, accordingly as simple weakness or despotism preponderated in himself. She reasons herself, however, when she sees him, into the hope that he may be true. Her repentance is more impassioned and earnest than her fault, and her self-reproach is disproportionately vehement, considering the cautiousness of her trust:—

“I bow my soul and knee
And sigh and do repent me of my fault
That ever I believed the man was true.”
* * * * *
“Forgive that I forgot the mind that runs
Through absolute races, too unsceptical!
I saw the man among his little sons,
His lips warm with their kisses while he swore,—
And I, because I am a woman, I
Who felt my own child’s coming life before
The prescience of my soul, and held faith high,
I could not bear to think, whoever bore,
That lips, so warmed, could shape so cold a lie.”

The second defect of this Poem to our minds is its limitation in scope and topic. It is too truly and too literally described by its title. We do not advance the objection which Mrs. Browning anticipates in her preface, that it narrates only the events she saw "from a window," and her impressions from them. A thoughtful mind may witness and learn and teach a vast deal from windows. We rather object to the windows being so few. The list of outward observations, in face of the multitudinous character of the contemporaneous events of a like interest occurring in Italy and in Europe, and which are necessarily present to the mind of the reader, is exceedingly brief.

There is only one form of material window out of which a Poet can exclusively look with full poetical result—it is that through which a prisoner sees a slip of common sky, or a chimney top. The outward gaze must be so extensive as to cover all that the mind can or would desire to see, or else it must be so limited as to throw the Poet for his materials on his own inner nature. The intermediate position is fatal to the full effect of poetry. It chooses a world, and that a little one. In fact, it is neither the world nor the mind, but a purposely limited portion of each, with the certain suggestion of much that lies beyond it, with a side-long vision and hankering after which the mind is perplexed and distracted. We have been so accustomed to take all Italy, nay, half of Europe, at a gulp from the Tourists, even poetical Tourists included, that we feel the Casa Guidi allowance very small,—and we have been so accustomed to see in the same paper of the same day so much of contemporaneous event, that we feel the tightness of the cordon placed by the olive groves of Florence round us.

Another principal defect in the present Poem is its voluntary subjection to the labour, restraint, and artifice necessarily accompanying rhyme, with scarcely one of those compensating advantages which ought to spring from it. The surprise, curiosity, gratification, musical delight, to which the sweet iteration of similarities, without sameness, gives rise in rhyme, are in this Poem diligently lost, and eagerly run away from. The printer and the reader for the most part have the exclusive advantage

of knowing that the author has taken the trouble to effectuate the rhyming peculiarity—the hearer through large portions of the Poem will be in profound ignorance of this interesting fact,—he will suppose that he is reading blank verse. The ear may be conscious of a rhyme sometimes by way of accident, but cannot, till aided by the eye, find out that there is rhyme throughout. This is a lamentable and vexatious effect—for the difficulty of making the rhyme is often unconcealed in this Poem, but the benefit to the ear is scarcely ever reaped. Nothing could have made “old Margheritone” “tremble,” “swoon,”

“And die despairing at the open *sill*
Of other men’s achievements”—

instead of at the door, or the window, or the sight of these achievements, except that a rhyme was wanted for the “will” of a previous line,—and even the music that there is in this sorry little note is quite lost to the general ear. No doubt the ear may be educated and attuned to carry a rhyme a long way. And if Mrs. Browning and other writers will agree to fill the world with poems, constructed on the principle of Casa Guidi Windows, the human ear may come to expect the rhyme where she chooses to place it, and be disappointed if it does not find it: and her own ear is probably thus attuned. But she has a very nearly exclusive benefit of the enjoyment. Tennyson, in his exquisite “In Memoriam,” has chosen a difficulty of this kind, and must be confessed to have triumphed in it—but more from his determination to educate the ear of his reader into the expectation of the music he chooses to furnish, and his refusal to distract his attention by any other variety, than by any natural or already formed general affinity of the ear of poetry-loving Englishmen to the locality of his rhymes. He has determined to balk and surprise the ear of his reader in every stanza, through a volume, till drawn along by the irresistible allurements of the course, the reader expects to be balked and surprised in every stanza, by the absence of a rhyme where he wants it, and its presence where he does not want it, and at length he would be amazed at not being balked and surprised as usual. It is not indigenous to the human ear

to love and look for a rhyming verse whose first and second lines do not rhyme, whose first and third lines do not rhyme, but whose first and fourth lines, and second and third lines do. By dint of intoning this peculiarity, the ear under Mr. Tennyson's auspices at length accepts it, and perhaps may register it for the future among its accepted realities.

There is still to us a fourth leading defect in this Poem. It is narrative and descriptive, not incidentally or mixedly, but essentially and as of its fabric. It is letters to friends put into verse. It is what might have been poetical prose narrative, turned into prosaic verse narrative. It is lively, pleasant, interesting reading, but unnecessarily trammelled with rhyme, that has no music in it, with feet that restrain its progress, and rules that impoverish its wealth and limit its freedom. A poet may write his prose in this way, as Wordsworth has written his—but it is not poetry—it is Poet's Prose. The prosy wisdom of much of the "Excursion," the prosier wisdom of more of the "Prelude," would properly have been ranked among the higher class of Moral Essays or Sermons in our language, characterized by the verse-style in which the author chose to embody his thoughts—had not the author proved himself a Poet on other ground. It is the music and the melody, the celestial discernment of things beautiful and good in the common matters of earth and day-light, the delicious simplicity, and the enriching imagination, that vivify and interpenetrate his smaller poems, and so many passages in his larger, that make one call anything of Wordsworth's by any name that he likes, and bind up his poetical prose and prosaic poetry all together, and bid the binder in reverence put "Wordsworth's Poems," on the outside of all. And so Mrs. Browning, having great versifying power, and being very fond of exercising it, presents us with a pleasant little volume of extracts from a journal of her residence in Florence, which it is according to her liking and idiosyncrasy to write in a verse form.

And now that we have done with what we consider the defects of this Poem, let us indulge ourselves in the acknowledgment of the pleasant reading it has been to us. We are grateful for anything from a pen, from which has already dropped so much that has enchained and entranced

us.* There is a copious spring in Mrs. Browning's nature of power and sweetness. She is a woman of wonderful talent, of unusual knowledge, of great spirit, and of a large mental experience. There is something at once manly and womanly in the character of her mind—energy large, and feeling deep. We miss in the present Poem her ancient pensiveness. We ought, we suppose, to rejoice that that phase has been succeeded by another. But "the soul is nursed for heaven by the discipline of a sacred sorrow. The look that is fixed on immortality, wears not a perpetual smile; and eyes through which shine the light of other worlds, are often dimmed with tears."† It was that union of the spirit of joy, with the shadows of grief—the energy and enterprize of healthy thought, at times bearing upwards, at other times itself borne down by, the accompanying weight of trial and pain—etherealized and spiritualized—that constituted to us the greatest charm of her poetry and her character. Perhaps we should not wish such things back again to the happy wife and mother; and we fear that secretly we are bemoaning our own fate, and are regretting that we have lost Miss Barrett, who was a very interesting person to us in her Poems.

Nobody, we presume, now dare publish a prose tour in Italy, still less the journal of a stranger's stay in Florence merely. Our authoress has wisely on the whole, therefore, taken her natural form of verse, and combined her allusions to pictures, and statues and poets, with a moment of profound European and universal interest. She has interwoven her allusions very skilfully and Byron-like with the main topic of her Poem. But when we cast our dim eyes athwart the interval of many years in attempted remembrance of that dear city of Florence, we feel almost a regret that the allusions are so few—and that they are rather learned, and from books, and in sympathy with feelings and creators, than natural, and from the heart of the eye, and in sympathy with the things created. We hear more of the workers than the works—of men than places—of events than sights—of history than material

* See Notice of her two vols. in an earlier Number of this Review.

† *Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty.* By J. J. Tayler.

reality. We have, indeed, such brilliant lines as these—the

“Golden Arno, as it shoots away,
Straight through the heart of Florence.”*

She takes the trouble of ascending to the Monastery of St. Gualbert also, and sees the billowy sea of hills that greets the gaze at the summit, and joins in the subsequent descent, both of which we well remember, down the long-winding various path on easy meditative gazing mule-back (with us) in the slanting rays of an October evening sun, with the far-spread undulating valley, the autumnal trees, the white-faced cottages and villas, placed just where a painter would have wished them, if he had not found them—and accordingly we have some pleasant lines on the text :

“And Vallombrosa, we two went to see
Last June, beloved companion.”

She is our guide also to “Santa Maria Novella Church,” and directs us to

“Ascend the right stair of the farther nave,
To muse in a small chapel scarcely lit
By Cimabue’s Virgin.”

We are taken also to Michael Angelo, whose

“Statues wait
In the small chapel of the dim St. Lawrence.”†

But she avoids many of the accustomed raptures, seems to kiss but shun the footsteps of those “worthier poets,” who stood and sang before in Italy—so as even, if we be not mistaken, to omit altogether the Venus, and the whole Tribune, and almost all the Pitti. In truth it is not as a lover of the art, but as an eager admirer of the mind and soul, of Italy, in all ages, that she takes her stand in this

* Notwithstanding which, for “golden,” read “muddy;” for “shooting away,” read “creeping away;” unless indeed the melting snows of the spring gave a little life to this common-place river at Florence.

† Roscoe took a good deal of pains to initiate us into the proper Italian forms of Italian names. It was a novelty to us English then. Mrs. Browning takes pains to turn most of them into English again, and that being now a novelty in its turn, it sounds agreeably.

poem, which is moral rather than æsthetic. She turns away indeed from those masses for the dead which we are but too much disposed to be always singing in Italy.

"We do not serve the dead,—the past is past!
God lives, and lifts his glorious mornings up
Before the eyes of men, who wake at last,
And put away the meats they used to sup,
And on the dry dust of the ground outcast
The dregs remaining of the ancient cup,
And turn to wakeful prayer, and worthy act.

* * * * *

O Dead, ye shall no longer cling to us
With your stiff hands of dessicating praise,
And hold us backward by the garment thus,
To stay, and laud you in long virelays!
Still, no! we will not be oblivious
Of our own lives, because ye lived before,
Nor of our acts, because ye acted well,—
We thank you, that ye first unlatched the door—
We will not make it inaccessible
By thankings in the doorway any more,
But will go onward to extinguish hell
With our fresh souls, our younger hope and God's
Maturity of purpose." Pp. 16-17.

Still her soul is large enough to understand the meaning
of the worship of the past and its saints.

"Cold graves we say? it shall be testified
That living men who throb in heart and train,
Without the dead, were colder. If we tried
To sink the past beneath our feet, be sure
The future would not stand.

* * * * *

Scant were the gardens, if the graves were fewer!

* * * * *

Who would build temples, without tombs in sight?
Who live, without some dead men's benison?
Who seek truth, hope for good, or strive for right,
If looking up, he saw not in the sun
Some angel of the martyrs, all day long
Standing and waiting!" Pp. 29, 31.

Of what passed beneath her own eye the description is very life-like. The two processions, for example—the one in the first part, when—"the day was such a day as Florence owes the sun"—the various estates go up to the Grand Duke at the Pitti, on his taking the oath, we presume, to the new constitution—the magistrates, the lawyers, the priesthood, the "martyrs" by their sign, the artists, the trades, the populace, the representatives of the several Tuscan States, with their banners; and then the "various children" which the world had sent out of "her teeming flanks," "Greeks, English, French." The other in the second part, when the Duke *returns*—

"From Casa Guidi windows, gazing, then,
I saw and witness how the Duke came back.
The regular tramp of horse and tread of men,
Did smite the silence like an anvil black
And sparkless.

* * * * *

Then, gazing, I beheld the long-drawn street
Live out, from end to end, full in the sun,
With Austria's thousands. Sword and bayonet,
Horse, foot, artillery,—cannons rolling on,
Like blind, slow storm-clouds gestant with the heat
Of undeveloped lightnings, each bestrode
By a single man, dust white from head to heel,
Indifferent as the dreadful thing he rode,
Calm as a sculptured Fate, and terrible!
As some smooth river which hath overflowed,
Doth slow and silent down its current wheel
A loosened forest, all the pines erect,—
So, swept, in mute significance of storm,
The marshalled thousands,—not an eye deflect
To left or right, to catch a novel form
Of the famed city adorned by architect
And carver, nor of Beauties live and warm
Scared at the casements,—all straightforward eyes
And faces, held as stedfast as their swords,
And cognisant of acts, not imageries." Pp. 103, 105.

Her reasons for not trusting a priest are all excellent—though Gioberti, probably the main originator of the last Italian revolution, has been publishing endless arguments

for years, to show how it is a Pope and a Pope alone who can liberate Italy and the world.

“ And yet we must
Beware, and mark the natural kiths and kins
Of circumstance and office, and distrust
A rich man reasoning in a poor man's hut,
A poet who neglects pure truth to prove
Statistic fact; a child who leaves a rut
For the smooth road; a priest who vows his glove
Exhales no grace; a prince who walks a-foot;
A woman who has sworn she will not love;
Ninth Pius sitting in Seventh Gregory's chair,
With Andrea Doria's forehead!”

Several portions of the Second Part would have offended us as common-place or thrust in, but for the admirable account to which they are turned by the skilful transitional allusions. Of this description are the lines on the Great Exhibition.

“ Just now, the world is busy: it has grown
A Fair-going world. Imperial England draws
The flowing ends of the earth,” &c.

But we pardon this and the conversations between the contributors, for the spirit of the appeal to which they are the introduction.

“ O Magi of the East and of the West—

* * * Is your courage spent
In handiwork only? Have you nothing best
Which generous souls may perfect and present,
And He shall thank the givers for? No light
Of teaching, liberal nations, for the poor,
Who sit in darkness when it is not night?
No cure for wicked children? Christ,—no cure!
No help for women sobbing out of sight
Because men made the laws?”

And so the apostrophe to her own child, with which the Poem concludes, her “own young Florentine,” to whom

“ The earliest world-day light that ever flowed,
Through Casa Guidi windows chanced to come—”

though spirited and mother-like, might lack sufficient reason for its place, but for the admirable skill with which she makes her young boy, in the wreck of her hopes for Italy and liberty, be to her "with his brave blue English eyes," the prophet of the ever fertile future.

"Now shake the glittering nimbus of thy hair,
And be God's witness; that the elemental
New springs of life are gushing everywhere,
To cleanse the watercourses."

There was some colloquial phraseology, appearing not always very agreeably in some of Mrs. Browning's former pieces, which was not important, because it was confined to the piece in which it appeared, and left others untrespassed on by its intrusion. But in a poem of greater length, and which is *one*, the appearance of similar phrases is an offence against the whole. We don't like

"When all's said, and howe'er the proud may wince,"

and we don't think at all that Michael Angelo would condescend to return the Grand Duke's vulgarity by being so vulgar himself, and saying

"Outlasting, therefore, all your lordships, Sir!
So keep your stone, beseech you, for your part," &c.

We don't like "there's room too, I repeat," in poetry. "Why, these are things," "Why the world were wrecked," sound better from the lips of Hotspur reading a letter in a drama—than in a didactic and descriptive poem. The interlocutions at the Exhibition are not at all to our taste, coming from the writer of the *Vision of Poets*: "These corals will you please to match against your oaks,"—"Here's sculpture,"—"Methinks you will not match this steel of ours,"—loquitur Mr. Rogers, of Sheffield, we suppose. "Nor you this porcelain," observes a gentleman from China or Dresden.

Nevertheless, or, as Mrs. Browning would remark, "when all's said"—here is a picture of the sojourn of a woman of genius and high spirit in Florence, full of colours that will not fade—full of life that will not die—of truth that will not perish.

ART. V.—BLAND'S AND KINGSLEY'S SERMONS.

Christian Charity considered in relation to the Love of God.

A Sermon delivered at the Octagon Chapel, Norwich, March 23, 1851. By Philip Bland, Perpetual Curate of St. Martin at Oak, Norwich. London. 1851.

The Message of the Church to Labouring Men. A Sermon preached at St. John's Church, Charlotte Street, Fitzroy Square, June 22, 1851. By Charles Kingsley, Jun., Rector of Eversley. London. 1851.

THESE are extraordinary publications—very significant of the strange times in which we live. The former is particularly worthy of notice, from the remarkable conjunction of the preacher and the place. The facts connected with Mr. Bland's occupation of the pulpit in the Octagon Chapel, Norwich, and the correspondence which ensued, are already familiar to most of our readers; but they are so remarkable from the deep-working tendencies which they imply in many earnest minds, that it cannot be out of place even now to recal attention to them. Ten years ago it would have been held utterly incredible—without some imputation of mental unsoundness on both sides—that a clergyman of the Church of England, having at the same time the cure of souls in a cathedral town, should preach, on the invitation of their minister, in the pulpit of the English Presbyterians in that same city—a pulpit, time-hallowed for its promulgation of a liberal theology, and now, though restricted to no creed, well known as one of the strong holds of Unitarian Christianity. But so it was—and so every Catholic spirit rejoiced that it should be. The clergyman and the minister felt themselves closely united in Christian sympathy and action, and agreed together that “the time was come to cease from distinctive action, and to trust in the swelling power of truth, and to labour constructively”—for that “the people want the bread of life, not Athanasian, Arian, or Unitarian disquisitions.” In this spirit the articulated clergyman took his stand in the free pulpit of English Presbyterianism—not to disguise his opinions, nor even out of indifference to opinions, nor because

he was not a zealous son of the Church—but because he thought he had some words of Life to speak, and that he ought not to refuse, but rather accept gladly, every opportunity of preaching freely the Gospel of Christ. In this, upon Christian principles, we hold that he was clearly right: and at the time of his taking this step, he believed himself right upon Church of England principles. He then declared, that he knew of no law of God or man, to prevent his preaching to any congregation that might be willing to hear him—"unless it were some black-letter statute which he never saw and never wished to see, and which, he supposed, he must equally transgress every time he lifted up his voice at a prayer-meeting in an unlicensed cottage, or at family worship in an unconsecrated drawing-room; both prayer-meetings and family-worship being quite uncanonical, although, perhaps, not altogether un-Christian." We give in his own manly and powerful words, the defence of his position which then satisfied him: in spirit it seems to us still unanswerable.

"I meet the dissenter, and I fraternize with him on a broader basis than the broadest church system that ever was—on the basis of our common Christianity, i. e. our common body and our common spirit and our common calling; our common Lord and our common faith and our common baptism and our common God and Father, who is above all, and through all, and in all. I meet the Christian Unitarian on the same basis which I meet my own Roman Catholic sisters and cousins; and when I have been suspended for crossing the threshold of my own mother's house, I shall think that I am in danger of being suspended for crossing the threshold of any other house where a dissenter lives, or dissenters meet. But to preach! Well! if I must be suspended, then I say, 'Suspend me if I do not preach; say that those amongst whom I go dishonour Christ, say that they deny the Lord who bought them; and if Christ be any thing more than a heading for a chapter or a text for a sermon, then the disorderly, the disgraceful, the criminal, the sinful act, must surely be the not confessing Him loudly and earnestly—the going to stare and not to preach—the fulfilling the work of a relation and leaving undone the work of an evangelist—the being where Christianity is supposed not to be, and the not carrying Christianity with you.' But there must be discipline. Ah! would that there were discipline! Would that there were discipline to reach us all, and to correct us, whenever and wherever we neglect our duties and do amiss! Would that the discipline of our Church and of all Christian

churches was what it should be, acting strenuously and with holy severity against all known and scandalous evil, but encouraging all good and all first and faintest beginnings of good! Where, however, is this discipline to be found? Nowhere certainly perfected; not in the Church of England, not in the newest and latest establishment of all the churches which are established amongst us. But growing, amongst both ourselves and others, I believe it is. And God be praised for it. To advance it, and not to retard it, is the bounden duty of all. And it is no duty, but a sin, to say we have it when we have it not, or to own we have it not, and yet to boast as if we had. I deem it to be no mark of affection to the Church of which we are members, to cloke over its faults, as if they were faults in some other body and not in our own; no mark of true and deep affection, where we parade it upon all occasions. No; but when our affection to the body of which we are members is called in question, then we may give the rein to our feelings, then may we say, as I say now, from the bottom of my heart, that we love and cherish our Church as we love and cherish our own body."

We think it was honourable to Mr. Bland, that in venturing on this act of liberality and Christian sympathy, he still retained his attachment to the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England. Had he approached nearer to the doctrines of the English Presbyterians, he would only have receded from them in spirit, in truth and uprightness, by continuing still to hold his place in the Established Church: and the test of his Catholicity would in that case have been far less decisive. We have therefore marked with especial satisfaction those passages in his Sermon, which show, that his theology was such as became his position. Unhappily the result has discovered only too plainly, that there is something in the genius of the Church of England which hinders her from approaching in any sense to the character of a national Church—something which makes it impossible for her ministers to unite a sincere attachment to her peculiar profession and service, with a practical recognition of other religious bodies, and an occasional communion with them in acts of Christian faith and love. Mr. Bland has been induced to consider his position a false one; and has resigned the curacy of St. Martin. Some of his friends, we are aware, regard this step as precipitate and unnecessary. He had been admonished by his diocesan, and might have continued his useful labours in his parish. One thing, however, is clearly proved by

the issue of this transaction, that a man cannot remain a minister of the Church of England, and at the same time acknowledge by preaching for them, the ministers of any other communion. She imposes on her sons the painful alternative of either suppressing their fraternal sympathies, or ceasing to be useful within her pale. Practically, we do not see how it can henceforth be disputed, that the Church of England is everywhit as exclusive—as completely assumes the pretensions of the one true Church—as the Church of Rome.

With regard to Mr. Bland's Sermon itself, it is a very striking exhibition of Christian Love as a working principle. It is not free from affectation, and is tinged by the exaggeration and grotesque vulgarity which so much of our modern religious literature mistakes for strength and originality. But the spirit of earnestness and Christian kindness shines clearly out. We give a specimen.

“Do little children when they kiss one another, when they play with and amuse one another, confer or receive favours? No, Christians: and (for there is more in this question than you may have thought) we shall not be like little children as you know, on the best authority, we are bound to become, on pain of losing our entrance into the kingdom of heaven; we shall not have been converted from our stiff and unloving nature into the gentle and pliable nature of a little child, until we learn thus to love one another. We shall have learnt to play our cards well in a society so artificial that it loves nothing but artifice, when we have learnt to cloke over our selfishness with a coat of many colours, soft to the touch and pleasing to the eye, with a mild answer here and a handsome subscription there, with now and then a proper burst of indignation against some oppressor, and now and then an expression of charitable consideration for some indiscreet enthusiast. We shall have learnt to approve ourselves to our church or our party, as it may be, when we have learnt to checker a life devoted to the pursuit of our own interests, with an occasional exhibition of disinterested effort for those with whom we wish to stand well. But assuredly we shall not have learnt to love one another as little children love one another, until we cease to regard those below us as only objects of pity, and those above us as gods to be propitiated, and those of our own rank as alone fit to be our friends, until we come to regard all of all ranks as worthy of our love, and possessed of a claim, of an absolute right, to all that we can do for them. All other love but this is a delusion, a deceit, a trick, a lie. It may preach powerfully in the pulpit or teach re-

gularly in the Sunday-school—it may quote texts or distribute tracts—it may put on a jaunty air and call itself liberality, or walk up and down with a demure face and claim near relationship with orthodoxy—it may bestow all its goods to feed the poor and give its body to be burned; but it is still a falsity: its work is no work of God, but only one of those works of darkness which Christ came not to bless but to destroy.

“And for the most part I believe that we are able of ourselves to find out the lie. We can distinguish pretty generally between genuine charity and all its counterfeits, whose name is Legion. We can see with our own eyes the difference between the spirit of one who counts every favour he gives, and adjusts his love to different ranks as a man adjusts the money in his purse, putting the gold to one end and the silver to the other; and the spirit of another, who sees, in all that he has, God’s property, to be stewarded for the good of all around him; and who has, in all around him, friends whom God has made to be such by making them his friends, and who are therefore as little to be offended or insulted or treated with neglectful contempt, as the Queen’s husband or his own relations. We can hardly go a yard from our house door without being compelled almost to contrast that stiff and prim apology for love, which paces up and down within its own narrow lines like that apology for a man, a soldier on the parade-ground, with this expansive and exhilarating love which, flowing from the full fountain of the love of God into as many channels as the Gospel itself can go, streams ever forth, spreading as it goes, like a river in a dry land, which fertilizes the banks that it washes with its waves, and widens evermore until it loses itself in the waters of the sea.

“But the thing which St. John brings home to us in the text (‘He that loveth not, knoweth not God: for God is love’) is, that this profit-and-loss style of relieving the poor and of getting rid of the debt of love which we are scarcely so blind as to mistake for charity, is not piety either. The thing which he establishes is, that they who in spite of all their ostentatious acts of apparently magnificent benevolence stand often exposed as close-handed and close-hearted skinflints before their fellow men, are not either right before God: that they who do not know aright their relationship with ragged urchins and maids of all-work, do not either know God aright: that, in short, to be without that love for one another which is death to all patronizing condescension on the part of the great, as much as to all obsequious servility on the part of the poor, is to be without that knowledge of God which alone is life eternal, for rich and for poor.”—P. 21.

Not less earnest and plain-spoken in its language, nor, as we truly believe, less honest and sincere in its purpose,

is the Sermon which Mr. Kingsley has just published, and which produced such excitement at the time of its delivery. The preface, we think, entirely acquits him of any breach of faith towards the clergyman in whose pulpit it was preached. Mr. Kingsley, it appears from a letter of Mr. Maurice, had been solicited to preach, in consequence of the deep interest felt in his published writings. He did not seek out the occasion which has exposed him to so much animadversion. The task having been undertaken under such circumstances, it was naturally to be expected, that he would preach as he had written. If there was anything therefore in the style and tone of his address, at war with the understood proprieties of the Church, the blame must fall on the clergyman who gave, and not on the one who accepted, the invitation. But we have here only another of the daily recurring proofs, how impossible it is in the Church of England as at present constituted, for a man to be thoroughly in earnest and to speak forth the whole mind that is in him, without coming into collision with some of the technicalities and conventionalisms which hedge him in on every side. We do not agree with Mr. Kingsley, and think his mind ill-balanced and over-excited; but the unmistakeable earnestness of tone which pervades his discourse, satisfies us that he meant uprightly, and that his heart is fervently benevolent. In a freer system he would ultimately right himself, and his impulsive spirit recover the equilibrium which it needs. There is the unstudied eloquence of a genuine Christian sympathy in the following passage:—

“When I have been inclined to take offence at people because they disagreed with me, because they seemed ungrateful or unjust to me,—then, beyond all arguments, that blessed sign has recalled me to my senses, and said to me—See, these men with whom thou art angry *are* thy brothers after all. Their relation to thee is God-given and eternal. Thou didst not choose them—God joined *thee* to them—and thou canst not alter His choice—thou canst not part thyself from them. Hate them, and turn from them, if thou darest!

“Above all, when I have been inclined to give in to that subtlest of all temptations—the notion that one Gospel is required for the man of letters, and another for the labouring drudge—that he may pamper and glorify himself on art and science, and the higher and more delicate subjects of thought, while for the poor man a little

reading and writing, and religion, is enough and to spare; then again, that sacrament has warned me: Not so,—one bread, one wine, for thee and them. One Lord, one pardon, one fountain of life, one feeling and inspiring spirit. They have not only the same rights, but the same spiritual wealth in them. If thou hast been put into circumstances, in which thou canst use thy gifts more freely than they can theirs, why is it but that thou mayest share thy superfluity with their need—that thou mayest teach them, guide them, nourish up into flower and greet the heaven-given seed of nobleness which lies in them as surely as in thee? For after all, as that bread and that wine proclaim to thee—thou hast nothing of thy own,—wit, scholarship, utterance,—what hast thou which thou didst not receive? Fool! instead of priding thyself on it as thine own property, confess it to be that which it is, the gift of God, who hath only bestowed it on thee as his steward—to give it freely to all, as he hath given freely to thee.”—Pp. 25-27.

We must add, however, that these generous sentiments and the gleams of great and eternal truth which break through them, are perplexed and darkened by assumptions and inconsistencies and a confusion of ideas, which prevent our seeing what is the writer's own conception—if, as we rather doubt, he has any distinct one—of the precise change which he would have the Church introduce into the present state of the world. What is this Church to which such marvellous efficacy is ascribed? And where is it to be found? It cannot be the Church of England, for he indignantly disclaims the idea (p. 16) of recognising men of his own opinions as brothers, and not men who differ from him. Neither can it be—as his text and his exposition of it might lead us to expect—the simple and formless institution of conversion and healing founded by Jesus of Nazareth—for he talks of priests and sacraments, ideas wholly alien to the Galilean ministry. The word Church, as used by him, is an unknown quantity which leaves the final sum of his meaning and purpose undetermined. Adopting the watchwords of the late French revolution as his own, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity—he finds their ecclesiastical equivalents in the Bible, Baptism, and the Supper of the Lord—the Bible proclaiming man's freedom—Baptism his equality—and the Supper of the Lord his brotherhood (p. 17);—not perceiving, with strange inadvertency, that of these three influences to which he looks for re-

storing peace, union and freedom to the world, the meaning, the efficacy and the obligation are now, and ever have been, subjects of the most vehement controversy among men, and that any attempt to fix or define them, in the present state of knowledge and opinion, by the Church or by any other authority, would involve a direct breach of the liberty and equality, and incurably divide the brotherhood, which they are held forth as the only possible means of producing. We may arbitrarily assume certain doctrines of the Bible to be incontestably true, and may arbitrarily assign to the Sacraments any signification that we like; and we may construct in this way a very plausible scheme of human peace and fraternity; but the difficulty will be to persuade others to adopt our views; and till that is done, the old disunion must continue, or submission be *enforced* on the reluctant—and then, what becomes of liberty!—We believe, indeed, that there *is* an unity ultimately attainable on all these objects; but the notion of restoring social union by the most active present causes of social antagonism, the very causes which are driving men asunder and preventing all effectual combination for educational or other purposes—is most extraordinary; and from a person like Mr. Kingsley, might seem incredible, did we not mark an evident Socialist tendency in the working of his mind: and in every form of Socialism we detect a latent, perhaps unconscious, design on the freedom of individual speech and action, amidst its loudest protestations of regard for the equal rights of all.

To the immense difficulties of every kind which surround our present social condition, and which demand for their adequate treatment, knowledge, experience, and reasoning powers of the highest order, as well as the guidance of humane and religious feeling—Mr. Kingsley brings only a generous and impulsive heart, considerable impatience of views opposed to his own, and the crudest, vaguest conception of the specific life of Christianity. We rose from his Sermon, in spite of our sympathy with its benevolence, with a profounder feeling than ever, how utterly the Church of England has failed in her mission of training men to be the mental and spiritual guides of the nation. Her intellectual instrumentalities are wholly unsuited to the social demands of the age. Her Creeds, and

the Bible in its bare literalness, are the only arms on which she can lay her hand to do service in the deepening conflict with misery and wrong. She is shut out from the actual world by ideas and usages which belonged to it centuries ago, and which then sufficed as a passage for mutual intelligence and communication. Now they no longer answer that purpose. Cooped up within these antiquated barriers, her best and worthiest sons fret and chafe under the invincible consciousness of social impotence; and they must either violently extinguish their noblest impulses, or in giving them vent, cause havoc and confusion by their sudden explosion.

ART. VI.—RUSKIN ON THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SHEEPFOLDS.

Notes on the Construction of Sheepfolds. By John Ruskin,
M.A. London, 1851.

MR. RUSKIN is the most eloquent writer of the day. Art is his special realm: but Religion, even more than Art, exalts his spirit to its noblest utterance. He is distinguished by his worship of Reality, and by his contemptuous rejection of whatever is not the best and truest of its kind. The Lamps that guide his feet are Sincerity and Truth, and the *artificial* is as abhorrent to him in Art as in Prayer. As he has deeply studied the higher functions of Art in its relations to Religion, he has naturally become as intolerant of the *unreal* in the one as in the other. Fictions of the imagination and the senses supply no worthy inspirations for one who would rear Temples of the severest workmanship, on foundations that cannot be moved. Mr. Ruskin, like all earnest minds, feeling that Truth is one in the spirit of it to all natures similarly constituted, has a vision of a Universal Church, and in the construction of his Sheepfolds he would simply take care that the stakes are set in the depths of man's nature and therefore of God's, if man is His child, and not in some loose, sandy, accretions, superficially prominent. By the Construction of Sheepfolds he means the construction of the Christian Church—not architecturally but spiritually. The gross fallacies, assumptions, confusions, and idle pretences to authority which shelter themselves under the word *Church*, shock Mr. Ruskin's sense of reality and truth. He finds it used for anything and everything that suits an Ecclesiastic's temper or purpose: and he simply inquires what is the *one* Scripture acceptance of the word, and why is it not *always* confined to that acceptance?

Here is an example of the looseness with which the word is used. An Oxford Divine says, "It is clearly within the province of the state to establish a national *Church*, or *external institution of certain forms of worship*." This interpretation Mr. Ruskin substitutes in certain pas-

sages of Scripture for the word *Church*, with these results,—“Unto the angel of the external institution of certain forms of worship of Ephesus, write,” &c.; “Salute the brethren which are in Laodicea, and Nymphos, and the external institution of certain forms of worship which is in his house.”

The one grand scriptural sense of the word is that of a congregation or assembly of men, but under three Christian modifications:—1st, that of the whole Body of Christ, the Faithful in all ages; 2ndly, all the *professing* believers in Christ existing on earth at a given time; and 3rdly, all the professing believers living in a certain city, place, or house. Proceeding on this Apostolic conception of the Church as including all orders of men who profess belief, Mr. Ruskin enters upon a fourfold inquiry: 1, the distinctive characters of the Church: 2, the authority of the Church: 3, the authority of the clergy over the Church: 4, the connection of the Church with the State. The first and second inquiries have two branches, of the Visible and the Invisible Church; the third and fourth relate to the Visible Church alone.

1. “What are the distinctive characters of the Invisible Church; that is to say, What is it which makes a person a member of this Church, and how is he to be known for such? Wide question—if we had to take cognizance of all that has been written respecting it, remarkable as it has always been for quantity rather than carefulness, and full of confusion between Visible and Invisible: even the Article of the Church of England being ambiguous in its first clause: ‘The *Visible* Church is a congregation of Faithful men.’ As if ever it had been possible, except for God, to see Faith! or to know a Faithful man by sight. And there is little else written on this question, without some such quick confusion of the Visible and Invisible Church;—needless, and unaccountable confusion. For evidently, the Church which is composed of Faithful men is the one true, indivisible and indiscernible Church, built on the foundation of Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief cornerstone. It includes all who have ever fallen asleep in Christ, and all yet unborn, who are to be saved in him; its Body is as yet imperfect; it will not be perfected till the last saved human spirit is gathered to its God. A man becomes a member of this Church only by believing in Christ with all his heart; nor is he positively recognizable for a member of it, when he has become so, by any one but God, not even by himself. Nevertheless, there are certain signs by

which Christ's sheep may be guessed at. Not by their being in any definite Fold—for many are lost sheep at times—but by their sheep-like behaviour; and a great many are indeed sheep which, on the far mountain side, in their peacefulness, we take for stones. To themselves, the best proof of their being Christ's sheep is to find themselves on Christ's shoulders; and between them, there are certain sympathies, expressed in the Apostles' Creed by the term 'Communion of Saints,' by which they may in a sort recognise each other, and so become verily visible to each other for mutual comfort.

2. "The Limits of the Visible Church, or of the Church in the second Scriptural sense, are not so easy to define: they are awkward questions, these, of stake-nets. It has been ingeniously and plausibly endeavoured to make Baptism a sign of admission into the Visible Church; but absurdly enough; for we know that half the baptized people in the world are very visible rogues, believing neither in God nor devil; it is flat blasphemy to call these Visible Christians; we also know that the Holy Ghost was sometimes given before Baptism, and it would be absurdity to call a man on whom the Holy Ghost had fallen, an Invisible Christian. The only rational distinction is that which practically, though not professedly, we always assume. If we hear a man profess himself a believer in God and in Christ, and detect him in no glaring and wilful violation of God's law, we speak of him as a Christian: and on the other hand, if we hear him or see him denying Christ, either in his words or conduct, we tacitly assume him not to be a Christian. A mawkish charity prevents us from outspeaking in this matter, and from earnestly endeavouring to discern who are Christians and who are not; and this I hold to be one of the chief sins of the Church in the present day; for these wicked men are put to no shame; and better men are encouraged in their failings, or caused to hesitate in their virtues, by the example of those whom, in false charity, they choose to call Christians. Now, it being granted that it is impossible to know, determinedly, who are Christians indeed, that is no reason for utter negligence in separating the nominal, apparent, or possible Christian, from the professed Pagan or enemy of God. We spend much time in arguing about efficacy of sacraments and some such other mysteries; but we do not act upon the very certain tests which are clear and visible. We know that Christ's people are not thieves—not liars—not busybodies—not dishonest—not avaricious—not wasteful—not cruel. Let us then get ourselves well clear of thieves—liars—wasteful people—avaricious people—cheating people—people who do not pay their debts. Let us assure them that they, at least, do not belong to the Visible Church: and having thus got that Church into decent shape and cohesion, it will be time to think of drawing the stake-nets closer."—P. 14.

3. This Idea of a Church, for its practical enforcement suggests the next question, what is the Authority of the Church? The Authority of the *Invisible Church* is nothing, because we cannot tell who are its members. The presumed Infallibility of the Church our author disposes by reckoning up fourteen direct injunctions, in Scriptural addresses to members of the Invisible Church, "not to be deceived."

"Now, no one could put up with Puseyism more patiently; if its fallacies were merely from peculiar temperaments yielding to peculiar temptations. But its bold refusals to read plain English; its elaborate adjustments of tight bandages over its own eyes, as wholesome preparation for a walk among traps and pitfalls; its daring trustfulness in its own clair-voyance all the time, and declarations that every pit it falls into is a seventh heaven; and that it is pleasant and profitable to break its legs;—with all this it is difficult to have patience. One thinks of the highwayman more with his eyes shut, in the Arabian Nights; and wonders whether any kind of scourging would prevail upon the Anglican highwayman to open 'first one and then the other.'"

4. Now, if there is no Infallibility, nor consequent Authority, in the Invisible Church, there can be none in the Visible, for we have "to alloy the small wisdom and light weight of Invisible Christians, with large per-centage of the false wisdom and contrary weight of Undetected Antichristians: which alloy makes up the current coin of opinions in the Visible Church, having such value as we may choose—its nature being properly assayed—to attach to it." The result of the whole is that "there is, in matters of doctrine, *no such thing* as the Authority of the Church."

But in matters of discipline what is the Authority of the Church?

"Much, every way. The sheep have natural and wholesome power (however far scattered they may be from their proper fold) of getting together in orderly knots; following each other in trodden sheepwalks, and holding their heads all one way when they see strange dogs coming; as well as of casting out of their company any whom they see reason to suspect of not being right sheep, and being among them for no good. All which things must be done as the time and place require, and by common consent. A path may be good at one time of day which is bad at another, or after a change

of wind; and a position may be very good for sudden defence, which would be very stiff and awkward for feeding in. And common consent must often be of such and such a company on this or that hill side, in this or that particular danger,—not of all the sheep in the world: and the consent may either be literally common, and expressed in assembly, or it may be to appoint officers over the rest, with such and such trusts of the common authority, to be used for the common advantage. Conviction of crimes, and excommunication, for instance, could neither be effected except before, or by means of, officers of some appointed authority.”

5. Who then are the Officers of the Church, the Clerisy, and what is their Authority?

The Bible Mr. Ruskin finds absolutely silent as to what the offices of the Clergy were in the first century, or as to what they shall be. And God does not prescribe offices, but only supplies the spirit that is to meet the necessities that arise,—and the necessities shape the office.

“Robinson Crusoe, in his island, wants no Bishop, and makes a thunderstorm do for an Evangelist. The University of Oxford would be ill off without its Bishop; but wants an Evangelist besides; and that forthwith. The authority which the Vaudois shepherds need, is of Barnabas, the son of Consolation; the authority which the city of London needs is of James the son of Thunder. Let us then alter the form of the question, and put it to the Bible thus: What are the necessities most likely to arise in the Church; and may they be best met by different men, or in great part by the same men acting in different capacities? And are the names attached to their offices of any consequence? Ah, the Bible answers now, and that loudly. The Church is built on the Foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the Corner Stone. Well; we cannot have two foundations, so we can have no more Apostles nor Prophets:—then, as for the other needs of the Church in its edifying upon this foundation, there are all manner of things to be done daily;—rebukes to be given; comfort to be brought; Scripture to be explained; warning to be enforced; threatenings to be executed; charities to be administered; and the men who do these things are called and call themselves, with absolute indifference, Deacons, Bishops, Elders, Evangelists, according to what they are doing at the time of speaking.—But there is one thing which, as officers, or as separate from the rest of the flock, they *never* call themselves,—which it would have been impossible, as so separate they ever should call themselves; that is,—*Priests*. It would have been just as possible for the Clergy of the early Church to call themselves Levites, as to call

themselves (*ex officio*) Priests.—The blasphemous claim on the part of the Clergy, of being *more* Priests than the godly laity—that is to say, of having a higher Holiness than the Holiness of being one with Christ,—is altogether a Romanist heresy, dragging after it, or having its origin in, the other heresies respecting the sacrificial power of the Church Officer, and his separating the oblation of Christ, and so having power to absolve from sin:—with all the other endless and miserable falsehoods of the Papal hierarchy; falsehoods for which, that there might be no shadow of excuse, it has been ordained by the Holy Spirit that no Christian minister shall once call himself a Priest from one end of the New Testament to the other, except together with his flock; and so far from the idea of any peculiar sanctification belonging to the Clergy ever entering the Apostles' minds, we actually find St. Paul defending himself against the possible imputation of inferiority: 'If any man trust to himself that he is Christ's, let him of himself think this again, that as he is Christ's, even so are we Christ's' (2 Cor. x. 7)."

The offices of the Clergy, under whatever names, are mainly Teaching and Discipline. We trust that his own Church will hearken to Mr. Ruskin preaching these noble truths, in this noble way.

"Whatever influence they may have over the Church, their authority never supersedes that of either the intellect or the conscience of the simplest of its lay members. They can assist those members in the search for truth, or comfort their over-worn and doubtful minds; they can even assure them that they are in the way of truth, or that pardon is within their reach: but they can neither manifest the truth, nor grant the pardon. Truth is to be discovered, and Pardon to be won for every man by himself. This is evident from innumerable texts of Scripture, but chiefly from those which exhort every man to seek after Truth, and which connect knowing with doing.—These, therefore, I hold for two fundamental principles of Religion,—that without seeking, Truth cannot be known at all; and that, by seeking, it may be discovered by the simplest. I say, without seeking it cannot be known at all. It can neither be declared from pulpits, nor set down in Articles, nor in any wise 'prepared and sold' in packages, ready for use. Truth must be ground for every man by himself out of its husk, with such help as he can get, indeed, but not without stern labour of his own. In what science is knowledge to be had cheap? or truth to be told over a velvet cushion, in half an hour's talk every seventh day? Can you learn chemistry so?—zoology?—anatomy? And do you expect to penetrate the secret of all secrets, and to know that whose price

is above rubies ; and of which the depth saith,—‘It is not in me,’—in so easy fashion ? There are doubts in this matter which evil spirits darken with their wings, and that is true of all such doubts which we were told long ago—they can ‘be ended by action alone.’

“As surely as we live, this truth of truths can only be so discerned : to those who act on what they know, more shall be revealed ; and thus, if any man will do His will, he shall know the doctrine whether it be of God. Any man :—not the man who has most means of knowing, who has the subtlest brains, or sits under the most orthodox preacher, or has his library full of the most orthodox books—but the man who strives to know, who takes God at His word, and sets himself to dig up the heavenly mystery, roots and all, before sunset, and the night come, when no man can work. Beside such a man, God stands in more and more visible presence as he toils, and teaches him that which no preacher can teach—no earthly authority gainsay. By such a man the preacher must himself be judged.”—P. 30.

In matters of Discipline Mr. Ruskin would confine the Authority of the Church, chiefly to the enforcement of Rules of Righteousness, excommunicating, until penitence was shown, the vicious and immoral, whose practical alienation from Christ was capable of being made visible to all men. In the Church Courts required for such Trials, though the presiding Officer must be professionally educated, he would have the jury to consist exclusively of laymen.

6. In the question of the connection between Church and State, he gets rid of the difficulty in this way. Throughout Christendom the Church *is* the State, inasmuch as all the people are professed believers. The exceptional element of Jews, &c., he disregards. The question then in his eyes has little more difficulty in regard to ecclesiastical than to civil matters. The State, that is the whole People represented by its Government, does in the matter of Religion what it deems best. For all the Government is Monarchical—that is, whether its Head be an elective Assembly, or an Individual, it must have authority to legislate for the Many, with power to enforce its determinations.

“What is its best form is a totally different question ; but unless it act *for* the people, and not as representative of the people, it is no government at all ; and one of the grossest blockheadisms of the

English in the present day, is their idea of sending men to Parliament to represent their opinions. Whereas their only true business is to find out the wisest men among them, and send them to Parliament to represent their *own* opinions, and act upon them. Of all puppet-shows in the Satanic Carnival of the earth, the most contemptible puppet-show is a Parliament with a mob pulling at the strings."

A Monarchy then, that is a Government, however constituted, that legislates and determines *for* the People, Mr. Ruskin thinks must have the same authority over ecclesiastical matters, as a father has in the case of his adult children—that is no power to coerce, to enforce any particular Rite or any particular Creed, but authority to provide and tender such instruction as he deems most salutary, and to establish such Religion in his own house "as he deems most convenient for his family." The adult children are at liberty to reject such provision, "but not without solemn conviction and deep sorrow."—In all this Mr. Ruskin tacitly assumes that the Governing Body is exclusively Christian, and that such differences as prevail among them are so immaterial, as to involve in the guilt of schism those who would make them sources of disunion. Accordingly he would exclude from the governing Body all infidels and Papists, as well as gamblers, debtors, &c. The Nation is first to be Christian, and out of the Church which is then the Nation, the governing Body is to be chosen. Mr. Ruskin contemplates no doctrinal differences that could prevent professing believers uniting in the same church, except in the case of the Roman Catholics, and these he would exclude from Church *and* State, "as idolaters, covetous, and extortioners (selling absolution), heretics and maintainers of falsehoods." This is the weak part of Mr. Ruskin's able Pamphlet: the real difficulties are not even present to his mind; and we presume that he is far from being free from a dogmatic conception of Christianity,—a conception of Religion under which it is impossible that the State and the Church should ever coincide. Yet his protest against the present state of matters in England is of admirable power, and in a Catholic spirit.

"This I must emphatically assert in conclusion;—That the Schism between the so-called Evangelical and High parties in Bri-

tain, is enough to shake men's faith in the truth or existence of Religion at all. It seems to me one of the most disgraceful scenes in Ecclesiastical history, that Protestantism should be paralyzed at its very heart by jealousies, based on little else than mere difference between high and low breeding. But the real difficulty, nowadays, lies in the sin and folly of both parties; in the superciliousness of the one, and the rudeness of the other. Evidently, however, the sin lies most at the High Church door, for the Evangelicals are much more ready to act with Churchmen than they with Evangelicals; and I believe that this state of things cannot continue much longer; and that if the Church of England does not forthwith unite with herself the entire Evangelical body, both of England and Scotland, and take her stand with them against the Papacy, her hour has struck. She cannot any longer serve two masters; nor make curtsies alternately to Christ and anti-Christ. That she *has* done this is visible enough by the state of Europe at this instant. Three centuries since Luther—three hundred years of Protestant Knowledge—and the Papacy not yet overthrown! Christ's truth still restrained, in narrow dawn, to the white cliffs of England and white crests of the Alps;—the morning star paused in its course in heaven;—the sun and moon stayed, with Satan for their Joshua."

ART. VII.—REFORMATORY SCHOOLS.

Reformatory Schools for the Children of the Perishing and Dangerous Classes, and for Juvenile Offenders. By Mary Carpenter. London: C. Gilpin, 5, Bishopsgate Street Without. 1851.

Official Catalogue of the Great Exhibition.

SCARCELY any two works could seem to have less immediate relation to each other than the two whose titles we have placed in juxtaposition. One traces on the imagination the magnificent symbol of all the wonders and glories of our modern civilisation—the crystal palace—with its interesting history and its rich contents; the other causes the mind to dwell almost exclusively upon images of rags and squalor, misery and depravity. The one fills the mind not only with large and beautiful conceptions, but with feelings of triumph at the present achievements of our civilisation, and of hope for its future glories; the other gives us awful glimpses of the hollowness of that civilisation, of the depths of vice, and all anti-social forces heaving and working beneath, and fills us with shame and sadness by the revelation of our neglects, and with fear and trembling by the foreboding of their consequences. Yet in truth are not the two in some degree supplementary to each other? Do they not present to our thoughts the two phases of our civilisation—our wonderful progress in attaining command over the world of matter—our terrible failures to control the world of mind? The one gives us a picture of our intelligence and energy, the other of our ignorance and apathy. We behold on this side every one of the tremendous powers of Physical Nature, cunningly subdued—obedient as children to our puny strength. We behold on that the picture of the moral elements, the elements of desire, will, conscience, intelligence, still mocking our control, and ever working among us wild confusion and ruin. *Here* we see every material of outward creation worked into shapes of beauty or utility. The hard lifeless stone takes the rounded form of exquisite loveliness. Mere loose fibres come and arrange themselves into fabrics of

wondrous grace and service. But there, in the streets and courts and houses of the great city, surrounding that very Exhibition, in almost every spot where such wonders are devised or wrought, we see multitudes of human souls, capable of every form of beauty and grandeur, and of an inestimable possible value—yet allowed to present an aspect of hideous deformity, and to be instruments of mischief to every valuable interest of society. We have an Exhibition intended to teach the nations the very lesson of the priceless value of the raw materials of Nature, and the inexhaustible and immeasurable power which man, by study, by industry, by art, may acquire over them. And we have an Exhibition of the rich materials of humanity—which similar study, industry, and art, could raise into value and importance that cannot be estimated,—now utterly neglected as the vilest of objects, and suffered to become a blot and a horror to the world.

In truth, the contrast is most startling ; and yet grateful should we be to humane and earnest labourers, who, like Miss Carpenter, help us to make it. The lesson she teaches us of the absolute necessity of other spiritual civilisation, is especially needed at present, now that the spirit of our more material civilisation is preaching its own lessons with such authoritative and irresistible force to the nations. The latter no longer speaks only from the closet of the mere philosopher, or timidly, and with half articulate voice at intervals, from industrial and commercial bodies. It draws after it the magnates of society, and calls its prophets and apostles from the high places of wealth, of aristocracy, and of royalty. Well, inasmuch as the lesson of material progress is true for what it contains, let it be preached ; and may faith in industry, in science, in art, in the power of man over Nature, spread and strengthen. But in the meantime society needs also to have impressed deeply upon it the lesson that there is a far higher glory and triumph of civilisation than the subjugation of Nature to serve the comfort, dignity and beauty of our outward life—that of *wielding the elements of human nature*, and educating, combining, and moulding them into forms of greatness and beauty, and directing them to purposes elevated and glorious. The deep faith and aspiration of a *spiritual* progress need now to be breathed into and

to animate the grosser faith and aspiration of *material* progress. And these needs are seen not merely from the contemplation of the superiority of the spiritual over the material progress, but also from a perception of the eternal and inseparable connection between the two. It is the great lesson of all history, that the civilisation is utterly delusive which consists in power only over the external elements of grandeur or of enjoyment, but exerts little or no control over the human elements in society, to reduce *them* to order and to virtue, to intelligence and religion. Such teachers as Miss Carpenter seek to remind society of this the greater half of its work, by presenting to it a picture of its neglects, with their terrible results. Of these Miss C. has collected for the general reader, from a mass of reports, and other sources not always easily accessible to all—or likely to attract attention—the most unquestionable and appalling testimony. She has shown how society not only abandons, in general, the formation of the young spirits which are to form its future mass, but allows to grow up in its midst a race of worse than savages of the wild—the children of the perishing and dangerous classes. These, from the character and circumstances of their parents, are not only from birth exiled from the presence of any salutary spiritual influences, but are reared in an atmosphere of vice and ignorance, misery and deformity, that forms them into secret sources of moral pestilence, and sends them forth active and restless enemies of all civilisation. She shows us, in large towns, a vast juvenile population “of those who have not yet fallen into actual crime, but who are almost certain, from their ignorance, destitution, and the circumstances in which they are growing up, to do so, if a helping hand be not extended to them; these form the perishing classes; and of those who have already received the prison brand, or if the mark has not yet been visibly set upon them, are notoriously living by plunder, who unblushingly acknowledge that they can gain more for the support of themselves and their parents by stealing than by working, whose hand is against every man, for they know not that any man is their brother; these form the *dangerous* classes. Look at them in the streets where, to the eye of the worldly man, they all appear the scum of

the populace, fit only to be swept as vermin from the face of the earth. See them in their homes, if such they have, squalid, filthy, vicious, or pining and wretched, with none to help, destined only, it would seem, to be carried off by some beneficent pestilence, and you have no hesitation in acknowledging that these are indeed dangerous and perishing classes."—P. 3.

She shows us these classes left by society in circumstances where it is almost impossible they should be other than criminal. We see them becoming, at an age when the children of the more fortunate classes are still in the nursery—familiar with all the most awful paraphernalia of the law—learning to stand with priggish self-assurance in the presence of the solemn tribunals of justice, and to meet with hardened eye the gaze of assembled and wondering spectators—to hear with frightful levity the decisions of juries and the sentences of judges—to have a home-acquaintance with the interior of prisons, and to look upon the inmates as their own fraternal class. She makes us blush at the farce of inflicting punishment on young creatures for acts which the fearful school in which they have been left has taught them to consider, if not right, at least laudable. She makes us review the immense "sham" of legal forms and penalties—kept in motion, at enormous cost, for these poor creatures, wasting the means of society, that might command a most efficient education, and yet neither deterring nor reforming, but actually so debasing the criminal, that even the administrators of the law are ashamed at its enforcement. And still, she shows us again, so debasing are the constant circumstances of these poor creatures, that the very magistrates, who are sensible of the farce and debasement of legal punishment, feel inclined to give the poor victim up to its mercies, in order to save him from the worse tyranny and debasement of wretched parents and companions.

"Serjeant Adams states, before the Select Committee of the Lords, that of the 100 prisoners whom he has to try every fortnight, from 16 to 40 are boys; some even of the age of 7; a few of 8, and a great number of 9, and upwards; of these children the offences are, for the most part, of a pilfering description, to which the young children are tempted by older persons." "A large proportion of these poor children," says Mr. A., "are wholly and

entirely without friends and relations of any kind; others have profligate parents who neglect them; another class have step-fathers and step-mothers, who abuse and ill-treat them. Some have parents who encourage them, and almost all are quite uninstructed in religious, moral, and social duties."—P. 15.

Much of the discussion, as to whether crime is the result of want of intellectual education, fills us with sadness; such an amount of ignorance—such an absence of any deep thoughtful examination of the matter does it betray,—we cannot help saying,—in the discussors. It surely could require no argument to prove that the mere ability to read and write can, in itself, be no more protection against crime, than the ability to interpret and to speak the common words of daily life. These arts are but the mere extension of the power of language, and can be used, it is evident, just as speech itself, to learn and communicate all that is infamous and dangerous as well as that which is improving and elevating. And the power of number is clearly as applicable to reckoning the gains of robbery, as to economising the gains of honest industry. It is not that the absence itself of a knowledge of these arts is the absence of aught that could have deterred from crime, but it is an evidence of the absence in the criminal experience of that contact with the civilised mind of the community—through the teacher—that could have communicated any moral or civilising influences to him. And it is thus, then, that we interpret the following facts. In proving the absence of the intellectual teacher from the experience of the criminal, it simply proves the general neglect of him by the civilised portion of society.

"I call it," says Mr. Clay, in his evidence before the Committee of the Lords, "extreme ignorance, when a man, or woman, or child, cannot repeat a word of prayer, when they cannot do it intelligibly. They attempt sometimes to repeat the Lord's Prayer, but they make gibberish of it. I call it extreme ignorance when they cannot name the reigning sovereign, or the months of the year. I have found a great number that did not know the months of the year; and when I put the question to them in the plainest way I can—'Do you know who is reigning over us?' the answer has been, 'No.'—'Do not you know the name of the Queen?' 'Prince Albert, is it not?' I have conversed with 1,301 men and boys, 287 women and girls, out of about 3,000 in this state of ignorance. I have found 1,290

men and boys, 293 women and girls, so incapable of receiving moral or religious instruction, that to speak to them of virtue, vice, iniquity, or holiness, was to speak to them in an unknown tongue."—P. 21.

A considerable portion of Miss Carpenter's volume is occupied in showing how general and glaring is this neglect of society, to bring the civiliser, the teacher, in relation in any way to the perishing and dangerous classes. But she shows us also, even where there have been some efforts to take up the work, in how feeble, faltering, and blundering a spirit they have been made. And here again we know no more bitter comment and satire that could be made upon our mode of conducting our ragged, pauper, and prison schools, than could be found in a comparison of that portion of their history contained in Miss Carpenter's work, with the history of the growth, erection and management of the Industrial Exhibition. When we think of the energy, the promptitude, the clear-headed sagacity, the dealing with realities as realities, the indefatigable perseverance and ready wit brought to bear down every obstacle, the wide acquaintance with the true properties and laws of the objects with which men had to deal,—displayed in the latter; and then think of the miserable trifling with the work, exhibited in our attempts at the education of the perishing and dangerous classes, our beggarly appliances—sometimes "one poor old woman" to control and guide a host of the most difficult spirits in the community—our superstitious belief in forms—persuading ourselves that scraps of catechism and scripture, and religious dogmas, will be talismans to protect the soul against the blasting atmosphere of crime—the absence from this labour of education of the strong minds of society that can alone do well the work—the absence above all of that primary and essential condition of success that the children shall be handed over by the legislature to the constant operation of discipline through some considerable period of their childhood—too truly are we made to feel with indignant sorrow that society has yet to learn the very conception of the work to be done. We are but as yet acting at education, and that in a most pitiable fashion. We do not present the appearance of

those who know what work they have to do, and are determined by God's help to do it. And we fear the real cause is that we have not yet any true *faith* in the power and reality of education. We *hope* almost against hope that it will do something to remedy the evils among us, because it is our last shift. But we do not know that it will, that it must, bring us salvation. And why? Because we have as yet no treatment matured, whose relation to the nature of the mind we know well enough to predict its effects. Our education is as yet too much but empiricism. For our own part, we see not how any deep faith in education can grow up in society at large, until education can be presented as a science, giving an account of its own processes, showing that they are founded on facts in the nature of the being to be educated, and are calculated—as we must judge from our own consciousness—to mould that nature to the *ideal* we propose.

Miss Carpenter has shown us but too clearly, we fear, the want of this faith in society. And in this way she preaches to us the same lesson which many other earnest reformers preach. We hear on every side, of the general absence of faith in great truths and hopes. But the great work needed at present is to have this faith made possible for us. We should have been glad if so thoughtful and experienced a mind as Miss Carpenter's had devoted a little more space in her work to the attempt to encourage this, at present, too feeble faith in education. We would, indeed, have society wearied, like the unjust judge, with the picture of wrongs and neglects. But after all, it cannot be doubted that this picture of the evils that cry for remedy fills the hearts of many good and earnest persons with somewhat like a deadening despair. They begin to fear that the evils are hopeless, and that we can do little more than keep down the volcano of ignorance and vice from bursting forth and destroying us. To extinguish or reduce it is beyond our hope. Miss Carpenter would have added to our gratitude had she taken up this part of the subject, and shown that reformatory education was possible, by clearly describing its nature and indicating its results. She shows in her statement of the general principles which must guide us in all such schools as she proposes, such a clear, and, it appeared to us, correct appre-

hension of these principles that our expectation was raised, and we suffered corresponding disappointment when we found that she had not worked out these ideas to their consequences.

We thoroughly agree with her view of the spirit in which reformatory, and we might add all other, education, is to be approached.

"First, and above all, there must be in the minds of those who plan, and of those who carry out the work, a strong faith in the immortality of the human soul, the universal and parental government of God, and the equal value in His sight of each one of these poor perishing young creatures with the most exalted of our race. We must feel even a reverence, blended with that intense pity which can never be separated from love, for these children, coheirs with ourselves of an eternal existence, and be able to discern under the most degraded exterior the impress of God's creative Spirit, one of those for whom Christ died."—P. 73.

It is only from this reverence for the individual mind that any deep earnestness for education, either in society or teacher, can proceed. Miss Carpenter's first principle seems so involve, though not clearly express, the essential grounds of all true zeal for education—faith in the moral and intellectual capacities and worth of the being to be educated. To us, faith in the immortality of the human soul seems to grow out of faith in its own native worth and greatness—faith, therefore, that it is of things too precious to perish. But here indeed lies one great difficulty. Society at large has not at present a reverence for the human soul. It has not a conception of the soul's moral and intellectual capacities. A high ideal of humanity does not dwell before its aspiration. Self-culture, intellectual and spiritual, is the earnest purpose of life with only few. The popular religion only indirectly encourages this purpose, and often in words throws slight upon it. It seems to us that only out of a religion that proposes to itself as one of its great aims to elevate and beautify human nature, to develop its higher powers and instincts, and mould it to the form of the highest ideal it can present—can a true conception of education or earnestness in its application be expected.

Yet we believe the educator may become the most

effective preacher of this religion. Setting before the world a proper conception of the aims of education, writing out, if we may use the expression, his ideal of the moral and intellectual character, exhibiting its beauties and its glories, its richness and its power—and showing by what methods it is possible to stretch forth towards this ideal, he may awaken nobler aspirations in men for themselves. We have a suspicion that the conception of education for others' and the conception of self-culture for our own souls, must be very similar. We doubt, in fact, whether the study of education and of the philosophy or religion of individual life be not in the end identical. Miss Carpenter seems to be impressed with this view. She quotes from Dr. Channing,

"To educate a man is to unfold his faculties, to give him the free and full use of his powers, and especially of his best powers;"

and adds,

"To all who engage in education it is most important thoroughly to study the nature of the mind and of the best means of so developing it as truly to educate it."

That Miss Carpenter has thus studied education, we cannot doubt; from her statement of the mode in which the moral and religious influences of reformatory education are to be effected.

"Love must be the ruling sentiment of all who attempt to influence and guide these children. This love must indeed be wise as well as kind, but it must be so evidently the pervading feeling of the teacher to his charge, that no severity on his part shall alienate them from him. Truly has it been said, 'There is one great instinct in every human breast, a weary longing for kindness from our fellow men, and delight in finding it.' But to children it is an absolute necessity of their nature, and when it is denied them, they become no longer children. None can tell but those who have witnessed it; the responsive love which is awakened in the heart of one of these forsaken ones by a kind look or word; or the purifying effect of the feeling,—now by many experienced for the first time,—that they are 'loved for themselves.' Love draws with human cords far stronger than chains of iron. While in the education of the young generally this element is a most essential ingredient, yet, if wanting in the School, it may be supplied in the home;—

but here?—if these poor children have a home it is but too often one to crush rather than cherish any feeling of affection; and towards society in general, at any rate the more favoured portion of it, we have already seen that ‘their hand is against every man, and every man’s hand against them.’ Law is to them only a natural enemy, whom it is most justifiable, and even honourable, to elude. Would we teach them to respect the law of man and reverence the law of God, it will not be by imposing on them a severe pressure, from which their elastic spirits will rise up more vigorous for evil whenever it is shaken off,—but by making them *feel* the brotherhood of man, and after teaching them to love man whom they have seen, they will learn easily to love God whom they have not seen, and to desire to obey His laws. It is love only which is the ‘fulfilling of the law.’ Love to the teacher will make what belongs to *him* sacred to the child who has hitherto thought all lawful booty;
 * * * * Love to the teacher may be made the means also of awakening the spiritual affections towards the Heavenly Father.
 * * * * It is only from the *known* that we can form some comprehension of the unknown; only from the seen that we can pass on to the unseen.”—P. 76.

These principles seem to us capable of being expanded into a true and valuable system for the guidance of teachers. And it is principally this expansion which we should have been glad to see from one who can apprehend and express so truly the essential principles themselves. Not only will society mechanically assent to Miss Carpenter’s propositions without seeing their deep meaning or consequences, but even teachers will sympathise with her views without knowing how to carry them out.

Miss Carpenter justly deems that the principal aim of reformatory discipline should be moral and religious influence. With regard to intellectual training she justly says:—

“If only to aid them in their religious and moral instruction it is needful to make the communication of useful and entertaining knowledge an important object, and not less so to enable them to enjoy higher pleasures which may take the place of the debasing ones to which they have hitherto had recourse.”—P. 104.

And to this we might perhaps add, that the very principle with which we set out, demands the highest intellectual culture that can be given. If we reverence the worth

of the individual soul on account of its own noble capacities, what right have we to deny it the largest use we can possibly give of its faculties? If to wield the power of true and vigorous thought be among the greatest privileges of the soul—if knowledge can build up the mind like a large and glorious temple—where ideas of truth and beauty shall be like beautiful statues and paintings ranged around, and where the highest feelings touched by these ideas shall pour their holiest music forth, like organ chants, what right have we to leave puny and hampered weakness when we can bestow this power,—and the poor mean hovel of the cramped and ignorant mind, when we can rear that noble temple? Yet it is important to remember also that, if the great aim of intellectual culture with the lower classes of society be to awaken the intellectual tastes and capacities in order that these may be in after-time not only a source of enjoyment, but of elevation of character, a noble resource of life, which shall raise its possessor above the low temptations and even discontents of his condition, then to attain this aim we must find a method of throwing round our first intellectual discipline some beauty and interest which it does not now possess.

Miss Carpenter shows that by moral and religious training she does not mean that training in mere moral and religious "wordiness" which too often passes for such. She has evidently a perception, though we do not see it clearly developed, that there is some influence which can come upon the heart to form it to love and duty, and which is independent of precept and of doctrine. The same sentiment we find floating in many works on education, and hear often dropped from the lips of teachers. Yet what is this influence, and how it is to be applied, few seem able to explain to us, though this is the precise point which at present more than any other it concerns us to know.

Let us consider what is the work to be done by our moral and religious training. No one will contend that it is merely to fix a number of certain forms of words in the memory. But perhaps fewer reflect that it cannot be either merely to fix certain ideas of moral and religious doctrine in the intellect. May we not define its true aim to be that of *awakening in the heart those feelings towards*

moral and religious objects, which like attractions drawing towards the great lodestars of existence, shall ever keep the life right and steadfast?

Now these great lodestars of the moral and religious feelings it seems to us may be stated thus:—

1st. Right action or virtue. 2nd. Knowledge. 3rd. High and noble characters, comprehending also the ideal of noble life. 4th. Christ. 5th. God. 6th. Immortality. If the feelings of love and approval, reverence and aspiration, were excited in the soul towards these venerable objects, we suppose most persons would allow a large amount of moral and religious training had been effected. The great problem, then, for the teacher is how to *awaken* these all-mastering attractions of the soul. And how is this to be done, but by unveiling the hidden nature of these great objects, and showing those high and interesting properties in them, which surround them, to the reverential mind with a halo of beauty and worth? And if we endeavour to perform this task by adapting our procedure to the laws of the soul, we shall soon discern a most important and overruling fact, namely, that there is an order in which these objects must be presented—that there are some which cannot be appreciated but by means of the very feeling which has been awakened towards others. Our moral culture must *begin* with endeavouring to awaken the love and approval of right actions, and of intelligence. For how shall the mind learn to love and reverence any great soul for its preference of the right until it has learnt to *know* the right by experience, and to feel that it is worthy to be preferred? And then will not a reverence for worth and intelligence in nobler humanity, be a fit preparation to raise the mind to veneration for the holy Christ, and worship for the perfect God?

Moral culture must then terminate, not commence, with religion. The first work of the moral and religious teacher is to present the actions of a true and noble life before the mind in such a character as to call forth towards them the love, approval, and aspiration. And this, it seems to us, can be done only by unveiling to the mind the real properties—the consequences and relations of these actions in human life—showing how they promote happiness and well-being—how they save exceeding pain and other evil,

both to those we love and others of our brethren around—how they build up and maintain the richness and beauty of our own souls, while the opposite actions go forth to work mischief around and return to cause deformity within. To begin at this point, with these moral pictures of life, is to appeal to *realities* in the soul. Pictures showing happiness or higher well-being rendered to others, especially to those we love—pictures showing them subject to suffering, or other evil that we can comprehend, awaken at once our *pity*, or sympathy, and, with regard to those to whom we are attached, our *love*. These feelings become, then, associated with the *actions* which satisfy them, and the actions are made beautiful, desirable, to us. But further, when the child is made to contrast these feelings of pity and love which moved him to the right actions, with the inferior ones which moved him to the opposite wrong actions, then *approbation*, the judgment of conscience, is called forth, and the actions are not only *loved* but *approved*, i. e., felt to be *right* and *noble*, because they proceed from nobler feelings.

The great difficulty the teacher would find, even with this method, in the perishing and dangerous classes, is that these very feelings of *love* and *pity*, which are the great powers with which he is to work, are not at first with them realities. He has to create them, that is, to awaken them, by becoming *himself* their centre. Here we feel the full force of Miss Carpenter's observations:—

"Love must be the ruling sentiment of all who attempt to influence and guide these children."

And again:—

"It is love only which is the 'fulfilling of the law.' Love to the teacher will make what belongs to *him* sacred to the child, who has hitherto thought all lawful booty."

But let the teacher by unwearied kindness towards these neglected creatures, awaken in them a *love* towards himself, this will soon expand into a capacity of *sympathy* with others, and he has then in the soul the first eternal realities of a moral consciousness, on which, with care and wisdom, he may erect the noblest moral life. We can only just indicate now that it is obvious, that this moral feeling, awakened

in the child, can be raised into reverence, by directing it upon high moral characters. These will now satisfy the soul by large performance of the actions, and manifestation of the feelings, it has learnt to love and approve. Thence the feeling may be raised, by similar steps, into veneration for Christ and worship for God.

We should be glad to find that some religious and experienced mind had worked out some such ideas as these, and shown in detail *how* the work of moral and religious culture is to be effected. Until this is done, and the materials for the work in some degree supplied, we have little faith in Reformatory Education, or indeed in any moral or religious Education at all. Without this, establishments like those Miss Carpenter recommends, however large and costly, however well arranged and provided in other particulars, will be only like huge well-constructed machines which may go on with powerful action and display, but which unfortunately can perform nothing because they have no contact with the object which is to be moved or wrought. If our moral and religious Education is still to mean what it has meant, the perpetual attempt to rear in the soul the apex of the moral pyramid—wanting any base upon which it can repose—to fill the memory with verbal formulæ, which depend for their interpretation upon non-existent feelings—then not only do we think we shall fail to awaken in society any large zeal for such an education, but even if we could succeed in this, the utter and certain failure of our educational labours would only tend to give society an excuse for worse apathy and neglect. It would cause Education also to be deemed, as many other things are deemed in which men have believed and hoped, a mere delusion and a lie.

Miss Carpenter has shown by her account of the reformatory institutions already existing, how utterly powerless is the education there given to save from crime. After describing the condition of the “perishing and dangerous classes” of children, the necessity of reformatory education, and the first principles by which it should be guided, she reviews the Schools which are in operation, “the Evening Ragged Schools, Free Day Schools, for those whose circumstances prevent them from receiving the benefit of the British and National Schools, and Industrial Feeding

Schools, as adapted to a class below that which the Free Day School can reach." She points out, that with all its advantages, the Evening Ragged School is utterly ineffective; that Free Day Schools, "though capable of producing a sensible and important effect," yet "must be conducted in many respects very differently from the ordinary existing ones;" that there must be "some special provision for their maintenance in a healthy and active condition;" and that Industrial Feeding Schools, to have their full operation on the classes for which they are intended, must have "attendance on them enforced by magisterial authority, on all children who subject themselves to police interference; and that legislative sanction must be obtained to make such enforcement." And she further argues, in order "that due support should be secured to such Schools, as well as that the burden of *maintaining* the children should fall where it ought, legal sanction should be obtained for requiring from the parochial funds the allowance to which each child in the School has a claim, or from the parents who have the means of maintaining it, a similar sum;—in all such cases, security being afforded that the Schools are properly conducted."—P. 260.

In the remaining chapters of her work, Miss Carpenter considers "the condition of those who have already received the prison brand, and who, whether as yet young in crime, or fully experienced in it, are, *as the law now stands*, almost certain to end their career only by receiving its highest penalty." She shows the effects of our gaol discipline, and reviews some of the Penal Reformatory Schools which have already been established.

Miss Carpenter has given us a valuable, and we sincerely hope influential, work. Its importance consists, to us, in the impression it leaves on the mind, of the absolute necessity of the education she recommends, of our terrible neglects, and often worse than useless labours hitherto: while the earnest tone of Christian love which pervades the book, must tend to subdue the mind of the reader to sympathy with its writer, and persuade him to become with her the friend and saviour of those "who are ready to perish."

ART. VIII.—OAKELEY'S RITUAL OF THE MASS.

The Order and Ceremonial of the Most Holy and Adorable Sacrifice of the Mass. By the Rev. Frederick Oakeley, M.A. London: James Burns, Portman Street. 1848. Pp. 209.

ACCORDING to the data on which we reason, the same things shall be solemn and trivial, respectable and contemptible, reasonable and absurd. "But one step between the sublime and the ridiculous," has its counterpart in, "but the difference of one premiss between the sacred and profane." Let us believe that the bread and wine upon the table is the Body and Blood of our Creator in sacrifice, and no reverence of approach, no solemnity of preparation, no minuteness of care in handling, can possibly be too great and circumspect for the occasion. Let us believe that God is a Spirit, and that the elements on the altar are and remain exactly of the same substance as the bread and wine of our daily food, and are only in any way sanctified, as the material and symbolic vehicles of holy thoughts and pensive recollections; and then the excessive homage and scrupulousness, just spoken of, becomes so much Fetishism—a degrading worship of a common material object, shaped and moulded by our own hands and passing into our own bodies.

Whether the Book before us, then, is a manual of devout thoughts, and reverential feelings, or a collection of egregious triflings and mock solemnities, is a question, the decision of which entirely depends upon the solution of the previous question, whether the doctrine of transubstantiation be true or not. If that doctrine be true, the book before us is a religious and suitable book—if that doctrine be false, the book is an idolatrous and absurd one—we do not mean in the mind and feelings of him who writes or him who sympathizingly reads it, but in the presence of eternal Reason and Truth. It happily is not among the number of our duties to argue upon or dis-

prove this doctrine. It appertains to those who, believing in the common doctrine of Incarnation, have need of the subtlest logic to show why they should *not* believe in Transubstantiation. For if they can show, which it appears to us they can, that Scripture does not require, and reason does not allow, a belief in Transubstantiation, *à fortiori* must we, whose principles lead us to question the doctrine of the Incarnation, (as the rude and gross expression of a high spiritual truth,) be convinced by the arguments advanced by themselves against Transubstantiation.

That the Spirit of God animated the bosom of that young Mother of Palestine, and that "the holy thing" that was born of her, was, in the sanctity of his character, and devout wisdom of his soul, the Son of the Most High, we believe: while we utterly reject the, to us, profane belief, at once materializing the Almighty Spirit, and degrading one of the holiest bonds in human life, which maintains that the material being Jesus Christ was born, not of human parents, but of a woman and the Holy Ghost. In the same manner we believe that the bread and wine on the Table of Communion are indeed holy, in the purpose to which they are set apart, in the memories with which they are fraught, in the benignity and sanctity of that being whose broken body and outpoured blood they show forth in symbol, and are therefore to be approached, to be handled, and partaken of (owing to these associations), with reverence. But we reject with something like horror the idea of their conversion, by the words of the priest, into the actual flesh and blood of the Eternal God. This supposition seems to us as gratuitous, and founded as completely on an original ignorance of the meaning of words, as any superstition on record. "This is my body." What is the "body?" The action or the substance? We maintain, manifestly the *action*. "This is Jerusalem," says the Prophet Ezekiel, when he had shaven off the hair of his head and his beard, divided it into three parts, burnt one, cut up another, and scattered the third, reserving a small remnant in the skirts of his garment—not of course meaning that the hair was turned into Jerusalem, or Jerusalem into the hair—but "this that I do unto this symbol I will do unto Jerusalem." Here it

was the *action*, the description, the incident, not the substance, that was Jerusalem. So Jeremiah (we purposely choose the well-known illustrations, because they are well known from being the best) goes forth into the environs of Jerusalem, and after denouncing the inhabitants for their crimes, takes "a potter's earthen vessel," breaks it and says, "Even so will I break this people and this city, as one breaketh a potter's vessel," &c. Now when we substitute the form of our Lord for that of the Prophet; the upper-chamber for the valley of Hinnom; and the bread for the bottle—what do we need more than to repeat the words of the Prophet, to arrive at the precise meaning of our Lord, "Even so will they break this body, as one breaketh bread"? The hard Passover biscuit held up and *broken* was the body of Christ: it was not the biscuit that was the body, but the *breaking* of the biscuit: as it was not the wine that was the blood, but the *outpoured* wine. The bread and wine were mere *corpora vilia*, by means of which was represented and conveyed the spirit and meaning of the symbol which lay not in that which the symbol was, but in that which *happened* to the symbol.

Even however, with the Roman Catholic's view of the elements and the sacrificial import of the Lord's Supper, we can scarcely understand, and we bitterly bewail, the entire absorption of religion into this single service. It is not only the centre, round which all the other services of whatever kind revolve, but it is the centre into which they all seem to merge and coalesce. A perpetual renewal of a physical miracle, a perpetual iteration of a sacrifice, offered in reality once for all, is the staple of which Roman Catholic devotion consists. The voice of the Church to her servants, is, "Perform this miracle—perform it daily, hourly, incessantly—by night and by day, in private and in public, in parish church and cathedral. Heed not that no one is by to hear or join in the prayers, or even to eat of the body, when created; perform the miracle: offer the sacrifice." This is the feature we feel as practically so lamentable in the service of the Mass—it is so independent of direct spiritual effect. The offering of the sacrifice, it is said, has an influence from without upon the souls of men;—and the Priest therefore, consecrating his elements, while the rest of mankind are asleep, is taught

to believe that he is doing them a great deal of good of some kind. But the soul of the Popular Faith is ever in substitution : and the Anglo-Catholic Clergyman, reading the Daily Prayer to the Clerk and an old woman, thinks that he is offering up prayers, just as the Priest thinks he is offering sacrifice, for the weal of the many. The Priest does it for us, and Christ does it for the Priest : and it is the essence of the whole system that no man does anything for himself. God is merciful, and much true devotion, much practical good, much holiness and worth of character, many cheerful hopes, many consoling helps, are permitted to gather round these services, which neutralise to a large extent their central error, and connect with them a blessedness scarcely their own.

While many of the prayers, exhortations, and instructions, associated with the service of the Mass, are taken from the broad and lofty spirit of the Christian Revelation ; the order, details, ritual and ceremonial of the service, originate in the sacrificial and transubstantiatory idea, and are the natural accretion of reverence and time. The whole in fact coheres with the central principle, and it is difficult to say, what of the whole could be consistently omitted. Each of the observances (to us so multitudinous and often unintelligible) is the product of a felt necessity of what the phrenologist would call the organ of veneration. We do not know where the detail of necessary reverences can properly cease. Reverence in thought must be commensurate with the thoughts, and reverence denoted outwardly must be commensurate with every possible action and attitude of the body. In secular life there is nothing analogous to it but the endless etiquette of the old Spanish or French court—where everything sprung in time naturally and almost necessarily from the central idea of the sanctity of the Royal Person and Presence. And as it was only in the modification of this idea that court etiquette could resolve itself into something more worthy of human nature both in prince and subject ; so it appears to us, the Roman Catholic ceremonial can only be reduced within rational bounds by a change in its subject, from a material presence to be outwardly revered, to a spiritual presence to be inwardly worshipped.

We shall now endeavour to give some illustration of these general statements from the book before us. The form of a series of conversations between an educated Catechumen and the Priest is adopted, as the vehicle of the Author's Exposition of the Order and Ceremonial of the Mass.

Part I. treats on the Service from the beginning of the Mass to the Creed. In the "Preparation," and while robing himself for the office, the Priest is required to offer the following suitable, and for the most part impressive and beautiful, Prayers :—

" On washing the hands.

" Grant, O Lord, such virtue to my hands that they may be cleansed from every stain, and that I may serve Thee without defilement of mind or body.

" On putting on the Amice.

" Place, O Lord, a helmet on my head, that so I may resist all the assaults of the devil.

" On putting on the Alb.

" Make me white, O Lord, and cleanse my heart, that, being made white in the blood of the Lamb, I may deserve eternal rewards.

" On girding himself with the Girdle.

" Gird me, O Lord, with the girdle of purity, &c.

" On taking the Stole.

" Restore me, O Lord, the Stole of immortality which I have lost in the transgression of our first parent; and although unworthy to approach thy sacred mysteries, may I inherit eternal joy.

" On putting on the Chasuble.

" O Lord, who hast said, My yoke is sweet, and my burthen is light, grant me so to bear Thy yoke, that I may obtain Thy grace."
—Pp. 10, 11.

On the point already alluded to, solitary Masses, the Catechumen puts this sensible and natural question, to which the Priest returns an answer to our minds possessing neither of these qualities.

" C. Excuse me, reverend sir, for interrupting you; but if the

Mass be a common act, how is it so often said without the attendance of any one but the server?

"P. I am glad to answer this question. The Church desires that there should be always hearers, and, if possible, communicants; but she will not suffer the backwardness of the faithful in coming to Mass and Communion to hinder the offering of that precious sacrifice, the fruits of which extend to many who do not personally assist at it. All, then, which the Church makes *essential* is the presence of *one*, who, in default of others, represents the body of the faithful. Moreover, every Mass has the Angels to assist at it, besides the sick of the parish, and others who are present at least in spirit. It is the pious custom in Catholic countries to toll the church bell at the Elevation in the Mass, that those who are hindered from assisting, may adore in their hearts. The same practice is also gaining ground in England."—P. 26.

This Part also contains explanations of the Introit, Kyrie Eleison, Gloria in Excelsis, Dominus vobiscum, the Collect (so called, probably, from the "gathering together" of the various needs and desires of the people into certain forms of prayer), the Epistle, Gradual (the response to the Epistle, so called, because originally sung from the steps of the altar), the Tract (a portion of the Penitential Psalms so called because sung in a mournful, *drawn-out* strain), the Gospel and Creed.

Part II. treats on the Service "from the Offertory to the Communion." In the explanation of the ceremonies attending the oblation (or offering up of the immaculate host (*hostia*, or victim) occur the following question and answer:—

"C. Why is the priest required to be so careful in wiping off any drops of wine which may have adhered to the inside of the chalice?"

"P. For a theological reason. It is not certain among divines whether these drops, separated from the main body of the wine, might not partake of the effects of the consecration. According to the opinion in the affirmative, if care were not previously taken to remove them, portions of the sacred Blood of our Lord might remain in the chalice after the ablution, and thus be exposed to the danger of irreverence. To obviate this risk, and to ensure the Priest against all scruples on the point, the rubric directs that the interior of the chalice shall be cleared of all detached portions of the wine."—P. 37.

Again:—

"The Lavabo.

"C. I observe, that at this period in the Mass the priest moves to the Epistle side of the altar; for what purpose?

"P. He moves to the side, in order to wash the tips of his fingers in a small vessel prepared for the purpose. While the server is pouring water on them, the priest says a portion of the 25th Psalm.

"C. What is the meaning of this action?

"P. The priest washes the thumb and forefinger of each hand, which, at his ordination, were consecrated for the offering of the adorable Sacrifice, lest, in the previous part of the ceremonies, any crumb of the sacred bread, or other matter, may have adhered to them. The symbolical use of this action is to remind him incessantly of the purity required in those who come before God at His altar. The ends of the fingers, and not the hands, are washed, to express that the priest shall be 'clean wholly.' See St. John, xiv. 10."—P. 40.

The explanation of the Orationes Fratres, the Preface, the Canon of the Mass, the Communicantes, the *Hanc igitur oblationem*, and the Consecration, follows. The latter we find thus introduced:—

"The Consecration.

"P. The priest has now to perform the most solemn act of the highest office in the world. In the exercise of the power which he has received at ordination, he is to make the most precious Body and Blood of our Lord present on the altar, to the unspeakable benefit and consolation of all faithful souls. This power it is which raises the priest, as St. Chrysostom says, above angels; for to compare it with any dignity of this world would be simply preposterous. Nay, if dignity there ever were, to which it may suitably be likened, it was that of the Blessed Virgin chosen by the Holy Trinity to be the means of giving the Eternal Son of God to the world. Collect then, dear brother, all your devout attention, while I instruct you in the ceremonies which the Church has prescribed on this great subject.

"The priest having concluded the forementioned prayer, which he says with hands joined, prepares for the Consecration, by first separating his hands, and gently rubbing the thumb and forefinger of each within the corporal" (the linen on which the bread or *body* lies).

"The reason of this action is to free them from any grain of dust,

or other substance, which they may have gathered up since the 'Lavabo;' or at any rate, to remind himself of the reverence due to the august mysteries he is about to approach."—P. 69.

Under the head of the Communion of the Faithful occurs the following instruction on the Fast before Communion:—

"C. And now, Sir, about the nature of this fast before Communion. Does it, like the ecclesiastical fast, allow of taking liquids?

"P. No; it is what is called a *physical*, i.e. natural, fast, and precludes the swallowing of any food or liquid whatever; so that water, taken even by accident, would debar the person from going to Communion on the same day.

"C. What, even a drop?

"P. A drop swallowed by accident along with the natural secretion of the mouth is a case excepted by the rubric from the general law.

"C. How minute are these provisions; an enemy might say, how trivial!

"P. Yes: but he would be a very shallow reasoner, for consider only the natural tendency of men to encroach upon laws which are not carried out into detail, and you will acknowledge the wisdom of the Church in making no exceptions to her rules but such as are required by necessity and charity."—P. 100.

We should almost suppose that some of the *habitués* of Roman Catholic doctrine and observance would be somewhat scandalized by the great explicitness with which, in his fresh zeal and unshrinking faith, Mr. Oakeley lays such mysteries as these open before the eyes of the profane, and must desire that some cypher were employed by which only the very faithful could understand them:—

"C. May the Blessed Sacrament ever be touched except by a priest?

"P. By no means whatever; if done consciously and intentionally, out of irreverence, or even indifference, it would be a mortal sin so to touch it.

"C. Accidents at the time of communion must be very distressing.

"P. Nothing should be very distressing which is purely unintentional; however, I do not deny that we may well be distressed, within due limits, at any even purely accidental injury to the Ma-

jesty of our Lord in the Blessed Sacrament; and on this account communicants should be very careful to assist the priest in the act of giving communion, by opening the mouth and presenting a sufficient surface of the tongue, though without opening the mouth too wide, or drawing the head too much back (which looks unseemly), or holding the tongue too much down, which is dangerous. I would advise all priests to instruct beginners in the right way of receiving communion, and converts especially, who are apt to find it more awkward than those who have been accustomed to it from early youth.

"*C.* I know some Protestants who laugh at all this particularity.

"*P.* So do I; the more the pity, not for us, but for themselves. I much suspect that those who charge our care of the Blessed Sacrament with over-nicety, much more those who jest upon it, would have passed their silly criticisms upon the act of St. Mary Magdalene, in the house of Simon the leper; or that of the holy woman who took spices to embalm our Lord's body; or of St. Joseph of Arimathea, who buried it with devout honour. If all this had not been love, certainly it would have been superstition."—*P.* 115-116.

And certainly if all these minute directions about tongue and head and thumb and finger—if all this centring of the soul's homage upon a body at best, a little paste apparently—be not the most wretched abuse of man's disposition for religion, the most irreverent lowering of the objects of his devotion and worship—we must confess to being the subjects of infidelity and blasphemy while aiming at the acquisition of the pure spirit of duty. This may be, and is, no doubt, the religion of a numerous and ancient Church—this may be, and is, no doubt, the honest accretion of the logically necessary results of certain given premises—but we think the true piety of man, and true conversion of the earth, depend upon our denial of it as the religion of Jesus Christ. And Mr. Oakeley resigns the service of the Church of England for this!

Part III. treats of the remainder of the Mass—the abolutions, the Communion and Postcommunion—the Mass of the Dead, High or Solemn Mass (i.e. the full service with all the due attendants and solemnities) and Church Music, with an Appendix on Solemn Vespers, Compline, (or final office of the day—the completion of vespers), and the Benediction.

We close this notice, not in a spirit of contemptuous amusement, but with a sense of profound sorrow—that so many conscientious and devout men should be at the same time such weak men, and consider the adoption of these cares and ceremonies and posturings an advance in their spiritual condition. What in the world must they have been before?